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INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
AND FORCED PSYCHIATRIC
DRUGGING IN THE TRIAL
COURTS: RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AS A MATTER OF COURSE
JAMES B. (JIM) GOTTSTEIN*
A commonly-held belief is that locking up and forcibly drugging people
diagnosed with mental illness is in their best interests as well as society’s as a
whole. The truth is far different. Rather than protecting the public from harm,
public safety is decreased. Rather than helping psychiatric respondents, many
are greatly harmed. The evidence on this is clear. Constitutional, statutory, and
judge-made law, if followed, would protect psychiatric respondents from being
erroneously deprived of their freedom and right to decline psychiatric drugs.
However, lawyers representing psychiatric respondents, and judges hearing
these cases uncritically reflect society’s beliefs and do not engage in legitimate
legal processes when conducting involuntarily commitment and forced
drugging proceedings. By abandoning their core principle of zealous advocacy,
lawyers representing psychiatric respondents interpose little, if any, defense and
are not discovering and presenting to judges the evidence of the harm to their
clients. By abandoning their core principle of being faithful to the law, judges
have become instruments of oppression, rather than protectors of the rights of
the downtrodden. While this Article focuses on Alaska, similar processes may be
found in other United States’ jurisdictions, with only the details differing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Law Project for Psychiatric Rights (“PsychRights”)1 was founded
to mount a strategic litigation campaign against forced psychiatric
drugging and electroshock in the United States.2 The impetus was the book
Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the Enduring Mistreatment of
the Mentally Ill, by Robert Whitaker.3 PsychRights recognized this as a
possible roadmap for demonstrating to the courts that forced psychiatric
drugging is not achieving its objectives but is, instead, inflicting massive
amounts of harm.
It appears that prior to PsychRights’s efforts, no involuntary
commitment or forced drugging order was ever appealed in Alaska. The
failure to prosecute any appeals and the lack of vigorous representation at
the trial court level has led to virtually uncontested proceedings that can
properly be characterized as shams. However, within a seven-month span,
in appeals prosecuted by PsychRights, the Alaska Supreme Court issued
two landmark opinions, Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute4 and Wetherhorn
v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute.5 Myers and Wetherhorn should force the State
of Alaska to change how it administers its forced drugging program and
should compel advocates of forced drugging patients to defend vigorously
their client’s constitutional and statutory rights. However, unless these
decisions are honored in practice, psychiatric respondents’ statutory and
constitutional rights will continue to be violated.

1. PsychRights was founded by the author in late 2002.
2. As far as the author is aware, forced electroshock is not mandated by courts
in Alaska. In 2006, due to what can only be considered an emergency, PsychRights
adopted strategic litigation against the enormous and increasing amount of
psychiatric drugging of children as a priority. Neither forced electroshock nor child
drugging are addressed in this Article.
3. ROBERT WHITAKER, MAD IN AMERICA: BAD SCIENCE, BAD MEDICINE AND THE
ENDURING MISTREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL (2002).
4. 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006).
5. 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007).
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This Article presents the scientific evidence and clinical realities not
being submitted to the courts and weaves into this presentation ways in
which psychiatric rights are being violated in Alaska—in spite of Myers
and Wetherhorn—as a matter of course. Part II introduces Myers and
Wetherhorn, focusing specifically on the Alaska Supreme Court’s
recognition of the limitations on the State’s power to involuntarily commit
and force drugs upon people found to be mentally ill. Part II also discusses
the importance of these cases, both within and without the state of Alaska,
but notes that they must be implemented in practice to be meaningful.
Part III presents the scientific evidence regarding the drugs most often
given to those who have been committed, showing that the drugs are far
less effective and far more harmful than commonly believed and that
people who are not given them, or who manage to get off them, are far
more likely to recover after being diagnosed with a serious mental illness.
Within this scientific presentation, Part III describes less intrusive
alternatives than forced drugging that produce far better outcomes.
Part IV and Part V provide necessary background material to
understand the current rights violations in Alaska. Part IV gives an
overview of United States Supreme Court cases establishing constitutional
limits on involuntary commitment and court-ordered psychiatric drugging,
including the requirements of proper procedures and evidentiary
standards with respect to involuntary commitment. Part V outlines
Alaska’s statutory framework for involuntary commitment and court
ordered psychiatric medication.
Part VI is a critique and description of ways in which current
procedures, in Anchorage at least, systematically deprive people of their
legal rights during involuntary commitment and forced drugging
proceedings, and Part VII discusses ways in which proper evidentiary
standards are not being followed. Part VIII presents two additional key
areas that are systematically depriving people of their rights: the State of
Alaska’s failure to provide available less restrictive and less intrusive
alternatives and the current lack of zealous representation, which, if
corrected, would presumably result in people’s rights being honored.
Finally, Part IX presents policy reasons why the State of Alaska should
embrace a modality that minimizes force and coercion and provides the
types of less restrictive and less intrusive alternatives that have been shown
to dramatically improve outcomes. According to the data presented in Part
III, this would result in at least halving the number of people diagnosed
with mental illness on the disability rolls.
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II. MYERS AND WETHERHORN
A. Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute
Section 47.30.839(g) of the Alaska Statutes provides, in part, that in a
non-emergency, where a mental health treatment facility has petitioned for
authorization to administer psychotropic drugs against a person’s will, “[i]f
the court determines that the patient is not competent to provide informed
consent . . . the court shall approve the facility’s proposed use of
psychotropic medication.”6
In her appeal from a superior court order approving the
“nonconsensual administration of psychotropic drugs,” Faith Myers
asserted the State must prove, under the Alaska Constitution and United
States Constitution, that the forced drugging was in her best interest and
there were no less intrusive alternatives regardless of whether she was
competent to decline the drugs or not.7 She introduced compelling
evidence regarding the harms and lack of effectiveness caused by the drugs
that the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) was seeking to force upon her, as
well as viable alternatives.8 The Alaska Supreme Court described this
evidence as follows:
The first [expert psychiatrist] testified that psychotropic
medication is not the only viable treatment for schizophrenia.
While acknowledging that psychotropic medications played an
accepted role in the “standard of care for [the] treatment of
psychosis,” he advised that, because such drugs “have so many
problems,” they should be used “in as small a dose for as short a
period of time as possible.” Myers’s second expert offered more
specific testimony that one of the drugs that API proposed to
administer to Myers—Zyprexa—was, despite being “widely
prescribed,” a “very dangerous” drug of “dubious efficacy.” He
based this testimony on a “methodological analysis” of the
studies that led the food and drug administration [sic] to
approve Zyprexa for clinical use.9
Although the superior court found it “troubling” that the “statutory
scheme prevented it from considering the merits of API’s treatment plan,
or [from] weighing the objections of Myers’s experts,” the court had
6.
7.
8.
9.

ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(g) (2006).
Myers, 138 P.3d at 240–41.
Id. at 240.
Id.
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approved the forced medication “[b]ecause it believed that the statute
unambiguously limited the superior court’s role ‘to deciding whether Ms.
Myers [had] sufficient capacity to give informed consent.’”10
Myers’s assertion that it was unconstitutional to force psychiatric drugs
on her flowed from a reading of the Alaska Constitution that being free
from unwanted psychiatric drugging is a fundamental right.11 The Alaska
Supreme Court agreed with Myers, holding that freedom from unwanted
drugging implicates fundamental liberty and privacy interests.12 The court
went on to note that “[w]hen a law places substantial burdens on the
exercise of a fundamental right, we require the state to ‘articulate a
compelling [state] interest’ and to demonstrate ‘the absence of a less
restrictive means to advance [that] interest.’”13 Finally, the Myers Court
held that although the police power does not provide a compelling state
interest under non-emergency forced drugging cases, the assertion that
these non-emergency actions are in the patient’s best interest under the
parens patriae doctrine does create such an interest in some situations.14
After discussing the significant negative side effects of the drugs, the
Alaska Supreme Court agreed that the right to be free from unwanted
psychotropic medications was “fundamental” under the Alaska
Constitution15 and stated that “the truly intrusive nature of psychotropic
drugs may be best understood by appreciating that they are literally
intended to alter the mind. Recognizing that purpose, many states have
equated the intrusiveness of psychotropic medication with the
intrusiveness of electroconvulsive therapy and psychosurgery.”16 Thus, the
court held:
[I]n future non-emergency cases[17] a court may not permit a
treatment facility to administer psychotropic drugs unless the
court makes findings that comply with all applicable statutory
requirements and, in addition, expressly finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the proposed treatment is in the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 246–48.
Id. at 245–46.
See id. at 248–49.
See id. at 246.
Id. at 242 (footnote omitted).
See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.838 (2006) (addressing emergency situations).
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patient’s best interests and that no less intrusive alternative is
available.18
This passage states the core holding of Myers, although by no means the
only important one. Other aspects of the decision are discussed below.
B.

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute

In Wetherhorn, Roslyn Wetherhorn was involuntarily committed for
being “gravely disabled” and subjected to a forced drugging order after a
hearing that lasted approximately fifteen minutes.19 She appealed,
asserting a number of errors, including that one of the statutory definitions
of “gravely disabled”20 was an unconstitutional basis for involuntary
commitment.21
Basing its decision on the Alaska Constitution, but citing to the
“repeated admonition” by the United States Supreme Court that, “given
the importance of the liberty right involved, a person may not be
involuntarily committed if they ‘are dangerous to no one and can live
safely in freedom,’”22 the Alaska Supreme Court held that committing
someone considered gravely disabled pursuant to section 47.30.915(7)(B) of
the Alaska Statutes “is constitutional if construed to require a level of
incapacity so substantial that the respondent is incapable of surviving safely
in freedom.”23 The court declined to decide whether the facts on the record
satisfied this standard because the case was moot,24 leaving development
of the standard for a future case. The court also upheld a number of other
lower court actions under the “plain error” standard of review applicable

18. Myers, 138 P.3d at 254 (footnote added).
19. See Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 374–75 (Alaska
2007).
20. Under section 47.30.915(7)(B) of the Alaska Statutes:
“[G]ravely disabled” means a condition in which a person as a result of
mental illness . . . will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer severe and
abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is
associated with significant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior
causing a substantial deterioration of the person’s previous ability to function
independently.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(7)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
21. Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 376.
22. Id. at 377 (citing O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 n.9 (1975)).
23. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 373–74, 384.
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when issues were not raised below,25 but in doing so injected some
troubling dicta that will be discussed below.26
C.

The Importance and Potential Impact of Myers and Wetherhorn

In the preface of the 2007 pocket section of his five-volume treatise on
mental health law, noted scholar Michael Perlin stated the following:
Wetherhorn . . . reflects how seriously that state’s Supreme Court
takes mental disability law issues. Last year, we characterized its
decision in Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, as “the most
important State Supreme Court decision” on the question of the
right to refuse treatment in, perhaps two decades. This year,
again, the same court continues along the same path, in this case
looking not only at the “grave disability issue,” but also building
on its Myers decision.27
Unfortunately, appellate decisions affirming rights in this area are often
ignored in practice. In other works, Michael Perlin has also noted that “the
mental disability law system often deprives individuals of liberty
disingenuously and upon bases that have no relationship to case law or to
statutes”28 and that “[a] right without a remedy is no right at all; worse, a
right without a remedy is meretricious and pretextual—it gives the illusion
of a right without any legitimate expectation that the right will be
honored.”29
The challenge posed by this Article is whether what Professor Perlin
described as “how seriously [Alaska]’s Supreme Court takes mental
disability law issues” will or will not be realized in practice.30 Discussed
below are a number of ways in which the actuality of involuntary
commitment and forced medication proceedings do not comport with
statutory and constitutional requirements. Unless and until these defects
are corrected, psychiatric respondents’ rights will continue to be violated in

25. Id. at 379, 383.
26. See infra Part VI.D–E.
27. 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, Preface to MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, at iii (2d ed. Supp. 2007) (footnotes omitted).
28. Michael Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist
Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 34 (1993).
29. Michael Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is
I’ve Got”: The Role And Significance Of Counsel In Right To Refuse Treatment Cases, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 745–46 (2005).
30. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 27, at iii.
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Alaska’s trial courts. As will be discussed in the next Part, the forced
administration of psychotropic drugs is causing great harm.

III. PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS ARE EFFECTIVE FOR FEWER
PATIENTS AND ARE MORE HARMFUL THAN COMMONLY BELIEVED
In Myers and Wetherhorn, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that
the drugs forced on psychiatric respondents have been equated with the
intrusiveness of lobotomy and electroshock.31 The following is a
description of what they feel like to many:
These drugs, in this family, do not calm or sedate the nerves.
They attack. They attack from so deep inside you, you cannot
locate the source of the pain. . . .
....
. . . The muscles of your jawbone go berserk, so that you bite the
inside of your mouth and your jaw locks and the pain throbs. For
hours every day this will occur. Your spinal column stiffens so
that you can hardly move your head or your neck and sometimes
your back bends like a bow and you cannot stand up. The pain
grinds into your fiber . . . . You ache with restlessness, so you feel
you have to walk, to pace. And then as soon as you start pacing,
the opposite occurs to you: you must sit and rest. Back and forth,
up and down you go in pain you cannot locate; in such wretched
anxiety you are overwhelmed, because you cannot get relief even
in breathing.32
This Part examines the long-term medical effects of these drugs. Drawing
substantially from an affidavit by Robert Whitaker filed in a September
2007 forced medication case,33 the following presents evidence that the
drugs cause a host of debilitating side effects, including the increased
likelihood that those administered them will become chronically ill. It also
presents the evidence that the newer drugs are no safer and have no
greater efficacy than the older drugs. In sum, patients resisting these drugs
are not crazy for doing so.

31. See Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 242 (Alaska 2006); see also
Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 382 (Alaska 2007).
32. JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON, 35–36
(1991) (emphasis omitted).
33. See Affidavit of Robert Whitaker, In re William S. Bigley, No. 3AN 07-1064
P/S (Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2007).
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A. Long-Term Effects of Neuroleptic Medications
Scientific support for the use of neuroleptics,34 which is the class of
drugs typically forced upon unwilling patients,35 stems from two sets of
studies. First, research by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
has shown that the drugs are more effective than a placebo in curbing
psychotic symptoms within a short span of time (six weeks).36 Second,
researchers have found that the more abruptly patients withdraw from
neuroleptic medication, the higher their risk of relapse.37
In the early 1960s, the NIMH conducted a six-week study of 344
patients at nine hospitals that documented the efficacy of neuroleptics in
decreasing psychosis.38 The drug-treated patients fared better than the
placebo patients at the end of six weeks.39 However, when the NIMH
investigators followed up on the patients one year later, they found, much
to their surprise, that the drug-treated patients were more likely to have
been re-hospitalized than those receiving a placebo.40 This development
was the first evidence of a paradox: drugs that were effective in curbing
psychosis over the short term were making patients more likely to have
additional psychotic episodes over the long term.
In the 1970s, the NIMH conducted three studies that compared
neuroleptic treatment with “environmental” care that minimized use of the
drugs. In each instance, patients treated without drugs did better over the
long term than those treated in a conventional manner.41 Those findings led

34. This class of drugs is also commonly referred to as “antipsychotics.” See,
e.g., Sutherland v. Estate of Ritter, 959 So.2d 1004, 1006 n.3 (Miss. 2007) (referring to
“neuroleptic (antipsychotic) drug therapy”).
35. See, e.g., Grant Morris, Pursuing Justice for the Mentally Disabled, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 757, 772–74 (2005).
36. See Jonathan O. Cole et al., Phenothiazine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 246, 259–60 (1964) (noting that “[n]inety-five per cent of
drug-treated patients showed some degree of improvement within six weeks—over
[seventy-five percent] showed marked to moderate degrees of improvement,” but
“only [twenty-three percent] of the placebo group were rated as showing marked to
moderate improvement”).
37. See Patricia L. Gilbert et al., Neuroleptic Withdrawal in Schizophrenic Patients,
52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 173, 184–85 (1995).
38. See Cole et al., supra note 36, at 259–60.
39. See id.
40. See Nina R. Schooler et al., One Year After Discharge: Community Adjustment
of Schizophrenic Patients, 123 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 986, 991 (1967).
41. See generally John R. Bola et al., Treatment of Acute Psychosis Without
Neuroleptics: Two-Year Outcomes from the Soteria Project, 191 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 219, 224–25 (2003); William T. Carpenter et al., The Treatment of Acute
Schizophrenia Without Drugs: An Investigation of Some Current Assumptions, 134 AM. J.
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NIMH scientist William Carpenter to suggest “that antipsychotic
medication may make some schizophrenic patients more vulnerable to
future relapse than would be the case in the natural course of their
illness.”42 Studies have shown that, by blocking the brain’s dopamine
receptors, neuroleptics cause the brain to develop super-sensitivity to
dopamine and, thus, a tendency toward psychotic symptoms.43
Furthermore, neuroleptics cause morphological changes in the brain that
have been associated with psychotic symptoms.44
As a number of studies document, long-term recovery rates are higher
for patients off neuroleptic medications than for those on such medications.
In 1994, Courtenay Harding at Boston University reported on the longterm outcomes of eighty-two “chronic schizophrenics” discharged from

PSYCHIATRY 14, 17–19 (1977); Maurice Rappaport et al., Are There Schizophrenics for
Whom Drugs May Be Unnecessary or Contraindicated?, 13 INT’L PHARMACOPSYCHIATRY
100 (1978).
42. See Carpenter et al., supra note 41, at 19.
43. See Guy Chouinard et al., Neuroleptic-Induced Supersensitivity Psychosis, 135
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1409, 1410 (1978) (“[N]euroleptics can produce a dopamine
supersensitivity that leads to both [an impairment in the ability to control
movements, characterized by spasmodic or repetitive motions or lack of
coordination] and psychotic symptoms. An implication is that the tendency toward
psychotic relapse in a patient who has developed such supersensitivity is
determined by more than just the normal course of the illness.”); see also Guy
Chouinard et al., Neuroleptic-Induced Supersensitivity Psychosis: Clinical and
Pharmacologic Characteristics, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 16 (1980).
44. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) studies have powerfully confirmed this
hypothesis. During the 1990s, several research teams reported that neuroleptic
drugs cause atrophy of the cerebral cortex and an enlargement of the basal ganglia.
See A.L. Madsen et al., Neuroleptics in Progressive Structural Brain Abnormalities in
Psychiatric Illness, 352 THE LANCET 784, 784–85 (1998) (“Our study showed an
unexpected effect of neuroleptic medication on cerebral cortex, but our analysis
suggests that the results cannot be taken as accidental.”). But see Raquel E. Gur et
al., A Follow-Up Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study of Schizophrenia: Relationship of
Neuroanatomical Changes to Clinical and Neurobiological Measures, 55 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 145 (1998) (noting that changes observed in the brain were correlated
with neuroleptic dose, but concluding that those changes could also have been
caused by progression of patients’ illness); Miranda H. Chakos et al., Increase in
Caudate Nuclei Volumes of First-Episode Schizophrenic Patients Taking Antipsychotic
Drugs, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1430 (1994) (concluding that striatal enlargement in
patients may have been connected to neuroleptic treatment or may have been
illness-related). In 1998, investigators at the University of Pennsylvania reported
that the drug-induced enlargement of the basal ganglia is associated with greater
“severity of both negative and positive symptoms.” Raquel Gur et al., Subcortical
MRI Volumes in Neuroleptic-Naive and Treated Patients with Schizophrenia, 155 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1711, 1716 (1998). While these articles may indicate these brain changes
might be due to the person having mental illness, no study of which the author is
aware has demonstrated these brain changes occur in un-medicated patients.
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Vermont State Hospital in the late 1950s.45 She found that sixty-eight
percent of this cohort showed no signs of schizophrenia at follow-up46 and
that these patients shared one characteristic: they had all stopped taking
neuroleptic medication.47
In studies conducted by the World Health Organization, sixty-three
percent of the schizophrenia patients studied in poor countries were
asymptomatic after five years and only twenty-four percent were still
chronically ill.48 In the United States and other developed countries, only
thirty-eight percent of patients were in full remission and the remaining
patients did not fare so well.49 In the undeveloped countries studied, only
sixteen percent of patients were maintained on neuroleptics over the five
years, versus sixty-one percent of patients in the developed countries.50
In response to this body of literature, physicians in Switzerland,
Sweden, and Finland developed programs that minimize use of
neuroleptic drugs. These programs have reported much better results in
terms of eliminating schizophrenia symptoms than what is seen in the
United States.51 In particular, Jaako Seikkula recently reported that, using
the open-dialogue approach, five years after initial diagnosis, eighty-two

45. Courtenay M. Harding et al., The Vermont Longitudinal Study of Persons with
Severe Mental Illness, II: Long-Term Outcome of Subjects Who Retrospectively Met DSMIII Criteria for Schizophrenia, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 727, 730 (1987).
46. Id.
47. See Patrick McGuire, New Hope for People with Schizophrenia, 31
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. (2000), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/feb00/
schizophrenia.html (“Harding . . . notes that all of those in her Maine and Vermont
studies who had fully recovered, had long since stopped taking medications.”).
48. See WHITAKER, supra note 3, at 226–32 (describing the World Health
Organization studies).
49. See id. at 230 Table 9.1.
50. Id.
51. See generally Luc Ciompi et al., The Pilot Project ‘Soteria Berne’: Clinical
Experiences and Results, 161 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY SUPPL. 145 (1992) (reporting positive
results from an experimental project providing alternatives to standard
pharmacotherapy); J. Cullberg, One-Year Outcome in First Episode Psychosis Patients
in the Swedish Parachute Project, 106 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 276 (2002)
(reporting that schizophrenics treated by a “parachute” method, which involved
fewer drugs than a historic group, had better functioning after one year than
patients in the historic group); V. Lehtinen et al., Two-Year Outcome in First-Episode
Psychosis According to an Integrated Model, 15 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 312 (2000) (reporting
that an experimental group of patients with first-episode functional non-affective
psychosis who received fewer drugs than a control group showed outcomes that
were just as good or better than those in the control group two years after
treatment, as measured by total time spent in the hospital, occurrence of psychotic
symptoms during the last follow-up year, employment, GAF score and the Grip on
Life assessment).
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percent of his psychotic patients were free of psychotic symptoms, eightysix percent returned to their jobs or studies, and only twenty-nine percent
of his patients had used neuroleptic medications during the course of
treatment.52
In the spring of 2007, researchers at the University of Illinois College of
Medicine reported on the long-term outcomes of schizophrenia patients in
the Chicago area since 1990.53 After administering five-year and fifteenyear follow-up exams, they found that forty percent of those who did not
take neuroleptic medications had recovered versus only five percent of the
medicated patients.54
B.

Harmful Effects from Neuroleptic Medications

In addition to making patients chronically ill, standard neuroleptic
medicines cause a wide range of debilitating side effects, including tardive
dyskinesia, akathisia, and emotional and cognitive impairment.
Tardive dyskinesia, which is usually caused by the heavy, long-term
use of neuroleptics, is a Parkinsonism especially prevalent in psychiatric
hospitals.55 People suffering from tardive dyskinesia may have trouble
walking, sitting still, eating, and speaking.56 In addition, people with
tardive dyskinesia show impaired nonverbal function.57 Akathisia, which
can also be caused by the use of neuroleptics, is an inner restlessness and
anxiety that many patients describe as extremely tormenting.58 This side
effect has been linked to suicide59 and assaultive behavior, including
murder.60

52. Jaakko Seikkula et al., Five-Year Experience of First-Episode Nonaffective
Psychosis in Open-Dialogue Approach: Treatment Principles, Follow-Up Outcomes, and
Two Case Studies, 16 PSYCHOTHERAPY RES. 214, 220–24 (2006).
53. Martin Harrow & Thomas H. Jobe, Factors Involved in Outcome and Recovery
in Schizophrenia Patients Not on Antipsychotic Medications: A 15-Year Multifollow-Up
Study, 195 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 406 (2007).
54. Id. at 409.
55. OXFORD MEDICAL PUBLICATIONS, TEXTBOOK OF ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS 542–
43 (D. M. Davies ed., 4th ed. 1991).
56. R. Yassa, Functional Impairment in Tardive Dyskinesia: Medical and Psychosocial
Dimensions, 80 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 64, 65–66 (1989).
57. James Wade et al., Factors Related to the Severity of Tardive Dyskinesia, 23
BRAIN & COGNITION 71, 75 (1993).
58. Theodore Van Putten, The Many Faces of Akathisia, 16 COMPREHENSIVE
PSYCHIATRY 43, 43–45 (1975); ABBOTT, supra note 32, at 35–36; WHITAKER, supra note
3, at 186–89.
59. See M. Katherine Shear et al., Suicide Associated with Akathisia and Deport
Fluphenazine Treatment, 3 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 235 (1982) (reporting
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Emotional and cognitive impairment have also been linked to the use
of neuroleptics. Many patients describe having zombie-like feelings while
on neuroleptic medications.61 In 1979, University of California at Los
Angeles (UCLA) psychiatrists Theodore van Putten and James E. Spar
reported that most patients on neuroleptics were spending their lives in
“virtual solitude, either staring vacantly at television . . . or wandering
aimlessly around the neighborhood, sometimes stopping for a nap on a
lawn or a park bench.”62 Moreover, studies have found that neuroleptics
may reduce one’s capacity to learn and retain information.63 As Duke
University scientist Richard Keefe said in 1999, “[t]he results of several
studies may be interpreted to suggest that typical antipsychotic
medications actually prevent adequate learning effects and worsen motor
skills, memory function, and executive abilities, such as problem solving
and performance assessment.”64
Other negative effects of standard neuroleptics include an increased
incidence of blindness, fatal blood clots, arrhythmia, heat stroke, swollen
breasts, leaking breasts, obesity, sexual dysfunction, skin rashes, and
seizures.65 Use of multiple anti-psychotics is also associated with early
death.66

two suicides of men with akathisia); WHITAKER, supra note 3, at 186–88 (relating
stories in which akathisia was a contributing factor in suicide or thoughts of
suicide).
60. Theodore Van Putten, Behavioral Toxicity of Antipsychotic Drugs, 48 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 13, 14 (1987); Igor I. Galynker & Deborah Nazarian, Letters to
the Editor: Akathisia as Violence, 58 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 16, 31–32 (1997); J.N.
Herrera, High Potency Neuroleptics and Violence in Schizophrenics, 176 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 558, 560–61 (1988); see WHITAKER, supra note 3, at 188–89 (telling
the story of a man’s “murderous explosion” while on neuroleptic medication).
61. WHITAKER, supra note 3, at 189–90.
62. Theodore Van Putten & James E. Spar, The Board and Care Home: Does It
Deserve a Bad Press?, 30 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 461, 461–62 (1979).
63. Richard S. Keefe et al., Do Novel Antipsychotics Improve Cognition? A Report of
a Meta-Analysis, 29 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 623, 626 (1999) (conducting meta-analysis
of fifteen studies to show link between anti-psychotics and cognitive functioning).
64. Id.
65. George W. Arana, An Overview of Side Effects Caused by Typical
Antipsychotics, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY SUPPL. 5, 5–8 (2000).
66. John L. Waddington et al., Mortality in Schizophrenia: Antipsychotic
Polypharmarcy and Absence of Adjunctive Anticholinergics over the Course of a 10-Year
Prospective Study, 173 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 325, 325 (1998); Matti Joukamaa et al.,
Schizophrenia, Neuroleptic Medication and Mortality, 188 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 122, 124–
25 (2006).
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Atypical Neuroleptics Do Not Provide a Safer Alternative

The conventional wisdom today is that the “atypical” neuroleptics67
promise enhanced efficacy and safety compared to the older drugs, such as
Haldol, Thorazine, and others.68 However, the new drugs have no such
advantage, and there is evidence suggesting they may be worse than the
old ones.
Risperdal (risperidone), which is manufactured by Janssen, was
approved in late 1993.69 After risperidone was approved, independent
physicians conducted studies of the drug. They concluded that risperidone,
in comparison to Haldol, caused a higher incidence of Parkinsonian
symptoms70 and had a greater adverse effect on eye movement.71
Additionally, many patients stopped taking the drug, most frequently
because it failed to reduce their psychotic symptoms.72 Jeffrey Mattes,
director of the Psychopharmacology Research Association, concluded in
1997: “It is possible, based on the available studies, that risperidone is not
as effective as standard neuroleptics for typical positive symptoms.”73
Letters in medical journals linked risperidone to neuroleptic malignant

67. Examples of atypical neuroleptics include Risperdal, Abilify, Zyprexa, and
Seroquel.
68. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs in
Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1209, 1210 (2005).
69. FDA CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 344 (28th ed. 2008) [hereinafter FDA
APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS]. Although it was hailed in the press as a
“breakthrough” medication, the FDA reviewed clinical trial data and concluded
that there was no evidence that this drug was better or safer than Haldol
(haloperidol). WHITAKER, supra note 3, at 274–77. The FDA told Janssen: “We would
consider any advertisement or promotion labeling for RISPERDAL false,
misleading, or lacking fair balance under section 501 (a) and 502 (n) of the ACT if
there is presentation of data that conveys the impression that risperidone is
superior to haloperidol or any other marketed neuroleptic drug product with
regard to safety or effectiveness.” Letter from Robert Temple, Director, FDA Office
of Drug Evaluation, to Janssen Research Foundation (Dec. 29, 1993) (obtained by
Freedom of Information Act request).
70. Michael B. Knable et al., Extrapyramidal Side Effects with Risperidone and
Haloperidol at Comparable D2 Receptor Levels, 75 PSYCHIATRY RESEARCH 91, 98 (1997).
71. John A. Sweeney et al., Adverse Effects of Risperidone on Eye Movement
Activity, 16 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 217, 217 (1997).
72. Renee L. Binder et al., A Naturalistic Study of Clinical use of Risperidone, 49
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 524, 525 (1998), available at http://psychservices.psychiatry
online.org/cgi/content/full/49/4/524.
73. Jeffrey Mattes, Risperidone: How Good is the Evidence for Efficacy? 23
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN 155, 157 (1997).
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syndrome,74 tardive dyskinesia,75 tardive dystonia,76 liver toxicity,77
mania,78 and an unusual disorder of the mouth called “rabbit syndrome.”79
Zyprexa (olanzapine), which is manufactured by Eli Lilly, was
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1996.80 However,
in its review of the trial data for Zyprexa, the FDA noted that Eli Lilly had
designed its studies in ways that were “biased against haloperidol,” such
as comparing multiple doses of Zyprexa with one dose of Haldol and not
using “equieffective doses.”81 Twenty-two percent of the Zyprexa patients
suffered a “serious” adverse event, compared to eighteen percent of the
Haldol patients.82 The clinical trials also revealed that Zyprexa patients
gained nearly a pound per week in the short term.83 Other problems in the
Zyprexa patients included Parkinson’s, akathisia, dystonia, hypotension,
constipation, tachycardia, seizures, liver abnormalities, white-blood-cell
disorders, and diabetic complications.84 Moreover, two-thirds of the
Zyprexa patients did not successfully complete the trials.85
Today, scientific circles are increasingly recognizing that the atypical
neuroleptics are no better than the old drugs and may in fact be worse. For
example, in 2000, a team of English researchers led by John Geddes at the
University of Oxford reviewed results from fifty-two studies and 12,649

74. Iman Bajjoka et al., Risperidone-Induced Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 30
ANNALS AM. MED. 698, 698–700 (1997); Steven Singer et al., Letter to the Editor, Two
Cases of Risperidone-Induced Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1234, 1234 (1995).
75. Kyung Sue Hong et al., Letter to the Editor, Risperidone-Induced Tardive
Dyskinesia, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1290, 1290 (1999).
76. See, e.g., L. Vercueil & J. Foucher, Letter to the Editor, Risperidone-Induced
Tardive Dystonia and Psychosis, 353 LANCET 981, 981 (1999); M.O. Krebs, Letter to the
Editor, Tardive Dystonia Induced by Risperidone, 44 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 507 (1999).
77. Matthew A. Fuller et al., Risperidone-Associated Hepatotoxicity, 16 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 84, 84–85 (1996).
78. W. Craig Tomlinson, Letter to the Editor, Risperidone and Mania, 153 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 132, 132–33 (1996).
79. Tomar Levin & Uriel Heresco-Levy, Risperidone-Induced Rabbit Syndrome, 9
EUR. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 137, 137 (1999). Rabbit syndrome is
characterized by “rapid, fine, rhythmic movements of the mouth . . . that mimic the
chewing actions of a rabbit.” Id.
80. FDA APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, supra note 69, at 305.
81. WHITAKER, supra note 3, at 280. See GRACE E. JACKSON, RETHINKING
PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS: A GUIDE TO INFORMED CONSENT 198–99 (2005); Affidavit of
Grace E. Jackson, In re Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., No. 3AN 03-277 P/S
(Alaska Super. Ct. 2003).
82. WHITAKER, supra note 3, at 281.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 281.
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patients.86 They concluded that “[t]here is no clear evidence that atypical
antipsychotics are more effective or are better tolerated than conventional
antipsychotics.”87 They further noted that Janssen, Eli Lilly, and other
manufacturers of atypicals had administered higher-than-recommended
average doses of the older drugs in their clinical trials.88 More recent
studies have come to similar conclusions.89
There is also growing evidence suggesting that the newer, “atypical”
neuroleptics may be linked to early death in patients. In a 2003 study of
Irish schizophrenia patients, twenty-five of seventy-two patients (thirtyfive percent) died over a period of seven and a half years,90 leading the
researchers to conclude that the risk of death for people diagnosed with
schizophrenia had doubled since the introduction of the atypical
neuroleptics.91 In 2006, in the United States, the National Association of
State Mental Health Program Directors published a study revealing that
people diagnosed with serious mental illness are now dying twenty-five
years earlier than the general population.92
D. Summary of Data on Neuroleptics
In summary, the research literature supports the following conclusions:
(1) neuroleptics increase the likelihood that a person will become
chronically ill; (2) long-term recovery rates are higher for non-medicated
patients than for those who are maintained on neuroleptic drugs; (3)

86. John Geddes et al., Atypical Antipsychotics in the Treatment of Schizophrenia:
Systematic Overview and Meta-Regression Analysis, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1371, 1371 (2000).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1374.
89. In 2005, a National Institute of Mental Health study found that there were
“no significant differences” between the old drugs and the atypicals studied in
terms of their efficacy or how long patients could tolerate the drugs before
terminating use. Lieberman et al., supra note 68, at 1218. The scientists studied
olanzapine, perphenazine, quetiapine, risperidone, and ziprasidone, and found that
seventy-four percent of the 1432 patients in the study were unable to stay on the
neuroleptics for eighteen months owing to the drugs’ “inefficacy or intolerable side
effects or for other reasons.” Id. at 1209. In 2007, a study by the British government
found that schizophrenia patients had a better quality of life when using the old
drugs than when taking the new ones. L.M. Davies et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Firstv. Second-Generation Antipsychotic Drugs, 191 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 14, 16–17 (2007).
90. Maria G. Morgan et al., Prospective Analysis of Premature Morbidity in
Schizophrenia in Relation to Health Service Engagement, 117 PSYCHIATRY RESEARCH 127,
130 (2003).
91. Id. at 132.
92. MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY IN PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 110 (Joe
Parks et al. eds., 2006).

02__GOTTSTEIN.DOC

68

5/27/2008 1:40:11 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 25:51

neuroleptics cause a host of debilitating physical, emotional, and cognitive
side effects, and lead to early death; and (4) the newer, so-called “atypical”
neuroleptics are neither safer nor more effective than old ones.
This scientific evidence shows it is incorrect to assume psychiatric
respondents who do not want to take these drugs are making bad
decisions. At the same time, it is not suggested here that people be
prevented from obtaining them because some people find these drugs
helpful. However, all patients and the judges hearing forced drugging
cases should be told the truth about the drugs’ effects and informed of the
fact that other approaches to treatment often result in a better outcome.93

IV. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally declared
involuntary commitment a “massive curtailment of liberty” requiring due
process protection.94 While the government does not have to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, it does have to prove it with more than a
preponderance of the evidence.95 Further, involuntary commitments are
constitutional only when: “(1) ‘the confinement takes place pursuant to
proper procedures and evidentiary standards;’ (2) there is a finding of
‘dangerousness either to one’s self or to others;’ and (3) proof of
dangerousness is ‘coupled . . . with the proof of some additional factor,
such as a “mental illness” or “mental abnormality.’’”96
The Court has suggested that the inability to take care of oneself cannot
be considered a sufficient finding of dangerousness, unless survival is at
stake: “a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends.”97 In addition, “although never specifically endorsed by the
[United States] Supreme Court in a case involving persons with mental
disabilities,” it also seems people may not constitutionally be involuntarily
committed if there is a less restrictive alternative.98
93. See, e.g., Seikkula, supra note 52 (suggesting that an open-dialogue approach
is effective in treating schizophrenia).
94. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
95. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979).
96. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–10 (2002) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2002)).
97. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575–76 (1975).
98. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 27, at § 2C–5.3.
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In Wetherhorn, the Alaska Supreme Court cited to this line of cases,
adopting the same standard, which allows involuntary commitment for
being gravely disabled only when a person is unable to survive safely in
freedom, but resting its decision on the Alaska Constitution.99

V. ALASKA’S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
As section 47.30.655 of the Alaska Statutes states, the purpose behind
the 1981 revisions to Alaska’s civil commitment statutes “is to more
adequately protect the legal rights of persons suffering from mental
illness.”100 In passing the revisions, “[t]he legislature . . . attempted to
balance the individual’s constitutional right to physical liberty and the
state’s interest in protecting society from persons who are dangerous to
others and protecting persons who are dangerous to themselves by
providing due process safeguards at all stages of commitment
proceedings.”101 This Part gives a brief overview of relevant portions of
Alaska’s provisions on committing people alleged to have mental illnesses.
Section 47.30.700 of the Alaska Statutes authorizes “any adult” to file a
petition to have someone screened for mental illness by alleging the person
is mentally ill and as a result “gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of
serious harm to self or others.”102 After the evaluation, if the court believes
that there is probable cause that the person is mentally ill and a danger to

99. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 378 (Alaska 2007).
100. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655 (2006).
101. Id. The statute goes on to outline the “principles of modern mental health
care [which] have guided this revision”:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

that persons be given every reasonable opportunity to accept
voluntary treatment before involvement with the judicial system;
that persons be treated in the least restrictive alternative environment
consistent with their treatment needs;
that treatment occur as promptly as possible and as close to the
individual’s home as possible;
that a system of mental health community facilities and supports be
available;
that patients be informed of their rights and be informed of and
allowed to participate in their treatment program as much as possible;
that persons who are mentally ill but not dangerous to others be
committed only if there is a reasonable expectation of improving their
mental condition.

Id.
102. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.700 (2006) (emphasis added).
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self or others or gravely disabled, the judge may have the person taken into
custody and delivered to a hospital103 by issuing an ex parte order.104
Section 47.30.705 of the Alaska Statutes authorizes what is known as a
Police Officer Application.105 Under this provision, any peace officer,
physician, psychiatrist, or licensed clinical psychologist may cause another
person to be taken into custody and delivered to a hospital, without any
court involvement at all, if he has “probable cause to believe [the] person is
suffering from mental illness and is gravely disabled or is likely to cause
serious harm to self or others of such immediate nature that considerations
of safety do not allow initiation of involuntary commitment procedures
[under section] 47.30.700 [of the Alaska Statutes].”106 It should be noted
that this section explicitly bars taking the person to jail or another
correctional facility, except for protective custody purposes.107 If a person
detained for evaluation is to be held involuntarily for more than seventytwo hours from the time of arrival at the hospital, he is entitled to a court
hearing on whether there is cause for detention within seventy-two hours
of first meeting with evaluation personnel.108
Section 47.30.730 of the Alaska Statutes sets forth the requirements for
an initial commitment petition, which may not last more than thirty days
(“Thirty-Day Commitment Petition”).109 Among other requirements, the
petition must “allege that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result is
likely to cause harm to self or others or is gravely disabled,”110 “list the
facts and specific behavior of the respondent supporting the allegation,”111
and “list the prospective witnesses who will testify in support of
commitment or involuntary treatment.”112
If the Thirty-Day Commitment Petition is granted, a ninety-day
commitment may follow under section 47.30.740 of the Alaska Statutes.113
In seeking a ninety-day commitment, “the professional person in charge”
or his “professional designee” must file a petition for ninety-day

103. “Hospital” within this Article refers to any mental health facility that can
provide mental health evaluation and treatment.
104. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.700.
105. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.705(a) (2006).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.725(b) (2006).
109. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730 (2006).
110. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730(a)(1) (2006).
111. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730(a)(7) (2006).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730(a)(6) (2006).
113. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.740(a) (2006).
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commitment before the initial thirty days expire.114 If a ninety-day
commitment is granted, an additional 180-day commitment may follow.115
Petitions for 180-day commitments may continue one after the other,
keeping the respondent committed.116
Although there is no statutory right to a jury trial for the thirty-day
commitment, there is such a right for the 90- and 180-day commitment
hearings.117 Further, the final decision on a 90- or 180-day commitment
must be reached within twenty days of filing the petition, or else the
respondent must be released.118 The twenty-day deadline may be extended
for no more than ten days upon the request of the respondent.119
Hospitals may give a committed patient psychotropic drugs in noncrisis situations only if the patient (1) has the capacity to give informed
consent and does consent; (2) has authorized use of such medication in an
advance health care directive, including authorizing a surrogate decisionmaker to consent; or (3) lacks the capacity to give informed consent as
determined by the court, and the court orders the use of psychotropic
medication.120 Section 47.30.837 of the Alaska Statutes sets forth the criteria
for determining whether a person has the capacity to give informed
consent to either accept or decline the drugs.121
In a crisis situation, hospitals are authorized to administer drugs under
very specific criteria and procedural protections, including limits on how
long and the number of times the hospital may administer medication as
the result of an emergency.122
The court may order administration of medication under section
47.30.839 of the Alaska Statutes.123 If the court finds that the respondent
lacks capacity (i.e., is incompetent) and never previously made known his
position on taking such medication while competent, the statute provides
that “the court shall approve the facility’s proposed use of psychotropic
medication.”124 The court must review any information that the patient’s
desire had “been expressed in a power of attorney, a living will, an

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.770(a) (2006).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.770(b) (2006).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.745(c) (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.770(b).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.745(g) (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.770(b).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.745(g).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.836 (2006).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(a) (2006).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.838 (2006).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839 (2006).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(g) (2006).
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advance health care directive . . . , or oral statements of the
patient[.]”125Additionally, a court visitor is appointed to assist the court in
determining the respondent’s capacity when a hospital files a petition for
court-ordered administration of medication,126 and the respondent is
entitled to his own attorney or an appointed public defender.127 In Myers,
the Alaska Supreme Court held that, under the Alaska Constitution,
application of this statute required findings by the court that the proposed
medication is in the respondent’s best interest and that no less intrusive
alternative is available.128

VI. CRITIQUE OF CERTAIN CURRENT PROCEDURES
As already noted, involuntary commitment is constitutionally
permissible only if it takes place pursuant to proper procedures.129
Presumably the same is true with respect to court-ordered drugging
because it also involves infringement of a fundamental constitutional
right.130
A. Ex Parte Orders: Ministerial-Like Issuance of Ex Parte Orders
Violates Due Process and the Express Mandate of the Alaska
Statutes
It is the author’s experience that, at least in Anchorage, judges
uniformly issue ex parte orders to have respondents taken into custody and
delivered to the hospital solely upon the filing of petitions under section
47.30.700 of the Alaska Statutes. When such a petition is filed, ex parte
orders are issued as a ministerial act, without any apparent inquiry as to
the validity of the alleged facts or any apparent consideration of whether
the alleged facts justify issuance. In doing so, a form is used which recites
the statutory requirements as follows:

125. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(d)(2) (2006).
126. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(d).
127. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(c) (2006).
128. Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 254 (Alaska 2006).
129. See supra Part IV.
130. See Myers, 138 P.3d at 247 (“Because psychotropic medication can have
profound and lasting negative effects on a patient’s mind and body, we now
similarly hold that Alaska’s statutory provisions permitting nonconsensual
treatment with psychotropic medications implicate fundamental liberty and
privacy interests.”).
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Having considered the allegations of the petition for initiation of
involuntary commitment and the evidence presented, the court
finds that there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is
mentally ill and as a result of that condition is gravely disabled
or presents a likelihood of causing serious harm to him/herself
or others.131
This ministerial-like issuance of ex parte orders is disturbing because it
violates due process, violates the express terms of the Alaska Statutes, and
is counter-therapeutic.
First, meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard are
the hallmarks of procedural due process.132 Thus, while emergency
circumstances in specific cases may justify an ex parte order, ex parte orders
under section 47.30.700 of the Alaska Statutes in non-emergency situations
appear to be unconstitutional in Alaska.133 The unconstitutionality of nonemergency ex parte orders was explicitly recognized by the Washington
Supreme Court.134
The Alaska Supreme Court has held, with respect to property interests,
that only when most or all of a class of cases involve exigent circumstances
may the State always proceed ex parte.135 Nothing justifies dispensing with
notice and an opportunity to be heard in the whole class of cases in which a

131. See Excerpt of Record at 4, Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d
371 (Alaska 2007) (No. S-11939), available at http://psychrights.org/States/
Alaska/CaseFour/Excerpt.pdf (including a copy of the ex parte order from the
Wetherhorn case).
132. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). The Court in Hamdi
stated that:
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has
been clear: “Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” It is
equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.’” (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (other citations
omitted)).
Id.
133. See Hoffman v. State, 834 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Alaska 1992) (“We have
consistently held that, except in emergencies, due process requires the State to
afford a person an opportunity for a hearing before the State deprives that person of
a protected property interest.” (citing Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211, 216 (Alaska
1981))).
134. In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (Wash. 1982) (“The danger must be
impending to justify detention without prior process.”).
135. Waiste v. State, 10 P.3d 1141, 1145–46 (Alaska 2000).
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mental evaluation is sought.136 Even if ex parte orders were to be permitted
in this whole class of cases, the court must perform its adjudicatory
duties—indeed it must do so with a heightened punctilio—because the
respondent has no opportunity to contest the evidence. This heightened
standard is analogous to the search warrant situation.137
Second, the issuance of ex parte orders prior to completion of the
screening does not comport with the Alaska Statutes. Under the express
language of section 47.30.700(a), a judge must immediately conduct a
screening investigation after an application is filed: “Within 48 hours after
the completion of the screening investigation,” the court “may issue an ex
parte order” and have the person taken into custody and delivered to an
inpatient psychiatric facility.138 To have the person taken into custody, the
Alaska Statutes require the court to provide findings that the person is
mentally ill and is either gravely disabled or likely to harm himself or
others.139 Under the Waiste and Hoffman rationales, there must be a
particularized set of findings justifying the granting of an ex parte order
based on the specific facts in each case. Presumably, these specific facts are
those developed in the required screening investigation that must occur
prior to any ex parte order being issued. Apart from failing to provide
factual findings applicable to the petition, it is the author’s experience that
the ex parte orders being issued in Anchorage fail to give any justification
for dispensing with notice and with an opportunity to be heard.
The issuance of ex parte orders is also harmful to respondents. When
the police pick someone up on an ex parte order, they are usually, if not
always, handcuffed, which is harmful in itself.140 Often, these individuals
are already experiencing great fear, and this exacerbates that feeling. Even
if others believe the fears are unfounded (i.e., the person is labeled as
paranoid), the fears are real to the people that are taken by the police.

136. Cf. id.
137. See, e.g., Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Alaska 1975) (“It is imperative
that a magistrate be presented with adequate supporting facts, rather than mere
affirmations of suspicion or belief.”); State v. Malkin, 772 P.2d 943, 947 (Alaska
1986) (“[J]udicial officer has the . . . duty to make a searching inquiry as to the
validity of the facts.”); State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 78, 82 (Alaska 1973) (“[C]ourts
must be willing to investigate the truthfulness of the material allegations of the
underlying affidavit in order to protect against the issuance of search warrants
based on conjured assertions of probable cause.”).
138. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.700(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. See Karen J. Cusack et al., Trauma Within The Psychiatric Setting: A
Preliminary Empirical Report, 30 ADMIN. AND POL’Y IN MENTAL HEALTH 453, 457
(2003).
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Without notice and other constitutionally required procedural protections,
such procedures tend to reinforce the belief in the minds of many
individuals with mental illnesses that others are “out to get them.” Instead
of automatically taking a person into custody through the use or display of
force when there are concerns about their behavior, someone should go
and talk to the person, explain the concerns, and work on de-escalating the
situation. Inquiry should be made into what difficulties the person might
be experiencing, and, if possible, assistance should be offered. Failing to do
so is inconsistent with section 47.30.655 of the Alaska Statutes.141
Testimony of Dr. Loren Mosher in the Myers case supports the
conclusion that judicial involvement should be limited to the absolute
minimum possible. As Dr. Mosher explained, involuntary treatment
should be “difficult to implement and used only in the direst of
circumstances.”142 Rather than forcing patients to conform, the therapeutic
imperative is that doctors must build trusting relationships with patients.
To this end, Dr. Mosher testified that:
[I]n the field of psychiatry, it is the therapeutic relationship
which is the single most important thing. . . . Now, if because of
some altered state of consciousness, somebody is about to do
themselves grievous harm or someone else grievous harm, well
then, I would stop them in whatever way I needed to. . . . In my
career I have never committed anyone. . . . I make it my business to
form the kind of relationship [through which the mentally ill
person and I] can establish a [sic] ongoing treatment plan that is
acceptable to both of us.143
Thus, in forty years of psychiatric practice working with the most psychotic
patients, Dr. Mosher never had to commit anyone because he talked to his
patients and established a relationship based on trust, rather than the

141. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655(1)–(6) (2006).
142. Transcript of Record at 176, In re Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., No. 3AN
03-277 P/S (Alaska Super. Ct. 2003), available at http://psychrights.org/
States/Alaska/CaseOne/30-Day/3-5and10-03transcript.htm. Dr. Mosher is a
board-certified psychiatrist who received his undergraduate degree from Stanford
University, medical degree from Harvard University Medical School, and was the
former Chief of the National Institute of Mental Health’s Center for the Study of
Schizophrenia. Id. at 171–72. When asked whether he had much experience with
un-medicated people experiencing psychosis, he replied, “Oh, dear. I probably am
the person on the planet who has seen more acutely psychotic people off of
medication, without any medications, than anyone else on the face of the planet
today.” Id. at 178.
143. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
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power to force. Ordering a person to be taken into custody and admitted to
a hospital through a ministerial-like entry also precludes the opportunity
to defuse, de-escalate, and resolve the situation without resort to more
judicial proceedings and force.
Ultimately, prospective hospital inmates144 should have the
opportunity to address people’s concerns before being taken into custody.
In addition to it being the right thing to do, providing the opportunity to be
heard is required by the Due Process clauses of the United States and
Alaska Constitutions.145
B.

Examination

Section 47.30.710 of the Alaska Statutes pertains to the evaluation of
persons already delivered to a hospital pursuant to subsections 700–705.146
It includes a provision that directs the evaluator to apply for an ex parte
order if the evaluator has reason to believe the person should be
hospitalized on an emergency basis and there has not yet been a judicial
order under subsection 700.147 However, since the person is already in
custody there is no exigency justifying ex parte proceedings and thus no
reason why this section should pass constitutional muster under the Due
Process Clause.148
C.

Notice of Rights and Filing Petitions

Section 47.30.725(a) of the Alaska Statutes provides that “[w]hen a
respondent is detained for evaluation under sections 47.30.660–47.30.915,
the respondent shall be immediately notified orally and in writing of the
rights under this section.”149 In the event a petition for commitment is
subsequently filed, section 47.30.730(b) of the Alaska Statutes provides that
“[a] copy of the petition shall be served on the respondent, the
respondent’s attorney, and the respondent’s guardian, if any, before the
30-day commitment hearing.”150

144. “Inmate” is defined as “a resident of a dwelling that houses a number of
occupants, especially a person confined to an institution, such as a prison or
hospital.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000).
145. See supra Part IV.
146. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.710 (2006).
147. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.710(b) (2006).
148. See Hoffman v. State, 834 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Alaska 1992).
149. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.725(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
150. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730(b) (2006).
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It is not uncommon, if not standard practice, for the Alaska Psychiatric
Institute (API) to wait until just before the involuntary commitment
hearing to serve the respondent with either of these notices. The treatment
of the appellant in Wetherhorn provides an example; she was brought to the
hospital late on April 4, 2005, or early on April 5, 2005, and a petition for
involuntary commitment was filed that same day.151 However, she was
served with neither the notice of rights required to be given “immediately”
when brought to the hospital, nor the petition for commitment, until an
hour before the scheduled hearing three days later.152 By waiting to
provide notice, respondents are denied a meaningful opportunity to
prepare a defense and are effectively prevented from obtaining a nonpublic defender attorney.
D. List of Facts and Specific Behavior
The hallmark requirements of the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution include the right to have “notice of the factual basis of
claims” made against oneself and “a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”153 Section
47.30.730(a)(7) of the Alaska Statutes requires that a petition for
involuntary commitment “list the facts and specific behavior of the
respondent supporting the allegation” that “the respondent is mentally ill
and as a result is likely to cause harm to self or others or is gravely
disabled.”154
In Wetherhorn, the only specific behavior cited to justify the petition
was “[m]anic state homeless and non-medication compliant x 3 months.”155
Since these facts do not support the allegation that Ms. Wetherhorn was a

151. Excerpt of Record at 1–3, Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d
371 (Alaska 2005) (No. S-11939), available at http://psychrights.org/States/
Alaska/CaseFour/Excerpt.pdf.
152. Id. at 8–11. The hearing was ultimately continued for a week, but not
because of any complaint about lack of notice by the assistant public defender
assigned to represent Ms. Wetherhorn. It is the author’s understanding that the
assistant public defenders handling these cases are often served with the petitions
the day of the hearing and that there is no preparation other than a brief conference
with the respondent just prior to the hearing.
153. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (other citations omitted)).
154. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730(a)(7) (2006).
155. Transcript of Record at 2, Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d
371 (Alaska 2005) (No. S-11939), available at http://psychrights.org/States/
Alaska/CaseFour/Excerpt.pdf.
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threat to herself or others, or that she was gravely disabled, it does not
appear these allegations were sufficient to support the petition.156 The
assistant public defender representing Wetherhorn at the hearing did not
object to the insufficiency of the petition, but it was raised by PsychRights
on appeal.157 Because the issue was not raised below, the Supreme Court of
Alaska applied the plain error standard, requiring a “high likelihood that
injustice has resulted” in order to overturn the lower court’s decision.158
Unfortunately, the court went on to state in dicta:
Wetherhorn’s proposed requirements go far beyond what Alaska
statutes require. Alaska Statute 47.30.730(a)(7) merely requires
that the petition allege “facts and specific behavior” supporting
the conclusion that the respondent meets the standards for
commitment and does not articulate the standard by which the
sufficiency of the facts and behavior listed is to be judged. And
because whether a person is actually committed depends on the
hearing, not on the petition standing alone, there is no reason to
require that the petition summarize all the evidence or be
sufficient in itself to entitle the petitioner to a grant of the petition
as a matter of law.159
This dicta misses the point that failure to provide the factual assertions
justifying commitment does not allow a psychiatric respondent a
meaningful opportunity to defend against the petition. This conclusion is
particularly true because of the extremely short time frame mandated.160
In other civil cases, the pleading must include allegations sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted or be subject to dismissal.161
The same is true for criminal cases: if a defendant is not arrested under
warrant, a judicial officer must determine if the person was arrested with
probable cause, as evidenced by the complaint, affidavits filed with the

156. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.370.730(a) (requiring that a petition for commitment
allege that a person is either a threat to self or others or is gravely disabled and that
facts or specific behavior supporting that allegation be listed).
157. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 380 (Alaska 2007).
158. Id. at 379–80.
159. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2006)).
160. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.725(b) (2006) (entitling respondent to a hearing in
order to determine whether there is cause for detention within seventy-two hours);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.725(f) (2006) (allowing a respondent, if represented by
counsel, to waive the seventy-two hour limit and to set a hearing date for no more
than seven calendar days after arrival at the hospital).
161. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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complaint, oral statements from the arresting officer, or oral statements by
another person recorded by the judicial officer.162
Similarly, a psychiatric respondent should be provided the alleged
factual basis justifying his detention in order to have a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. If involuntary commitment respondents are not
entitled to know what alleged facts will be used to justify their
confinement, the Alaska Supreme Court will have carved out an exception
to the otherwise universal elimination of ambush litigation embraced in the
United States after the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938. The “massive curtailment of liberty” represented by
involuntary commitment,163 and the short time frames involved, make the
prejudice extreme if the petition does not provide factual allegations legally
sufficient to justify the psychiatric incarceration requested. Therefore, it is
suggested here that the Alaska Supreme Court’s affirmance of the
Wetherhorn petition can only be understood in the context of the failure to
raise the issue at the trial court level and that, on appeal, Wetherhorn did
not show that failure resulted in a high likelihood that injustice resulted
under the plain error standard of review.
E.

List of Prospective Witnesses

Section 47.30.730(a)(6) of the Alaska Statutes requires that the
commitment petition list the prospective witnesses who will testify in
support of commitment.164 In the Wetherhorn case, no prospective witnesses
were listed on the petition.165 Again, this problem was raised for the first
time on appeal.166 After acknowledging that the failure to list witnesses
was a clear violation of the statute, the court held that the failure did not
amount to plain error:
[I]t is unclear what prejudice resulted from the failure to list
witnesses in this case. Here, the petition for thirty-day
commitment was signed by two API physicians and the only
witness testifying before the hearing was another API physician.
As API puts it, “[t]hat a psychiatrist from API would testify in

162. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1).
163. Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 378.
164. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730(a)(6) (2006).
165. Excerpt of Record at 6, Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371
(Alaska 2005) (No. S-11939), available at http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/
CaseFour/Excerpt.pdf.
166. Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 379.
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support of a petition initiated by API could surprise no one.” We
therefore conclude that the failure to list witnesses in this case
does not constitute plain error.167
Here, the court was more explicit that the basis for affirmance was the
failure to meet the plain error standard. Even so, it is troubling that, in
dicta, the court would agree with the hospital that respondents should
know that a psychiatrist from API would testify.168 The court, in fact,
missed the point: respondents cannot adequately prepare if they must
guess which psychiatrist is going to testify. It is also troubling if the court
has blessed total non-compliance with the statutory requirement that the
prospective witnesses be listed169 by affirming the petition in Wetherhorn
that listed no witnesses.170 Thus, as with specifying the factual basis of the
petition discussed in the previous section, it is suggested here that the
Alaska Supreme Court’s affirmance of the Wetherhorn petition’s failure to
list any witnesses can only be understood in the context of the failure to
raise the issue at the trial court level, and that, on appeal, Wetherhorn did
not show that failure resulted in a high likelihood that injustice had
occurred under the plain error standard of review.
F.

Court-Ordered Administration of Medication

1. Best Interests. In Myers, the Supreme Court of Alaska required the
additional element that the proposed medication be in the best interest of
the respondent.171 However, almost two years later, the forced medication
petitions that are filed fail to comply with this requirement.
In making the best interest determination, the court in Myers held that
“[e]valuating whether a proposed course of psychotropic medication is in
the best interests of a patient . . . at a minimum [requires] that courts
should consider the information that our statutes direct the treatment
facility to give to its patients in order to ensure the patient’s ability to make
an informed treatment choice.”172 The court then noted that it found

167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730(a)(6) (2006).
170. Excerpt of Record at 6, Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371
(Alaska 2005) (No. S-11939), available at http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/
CaseFour/Excerpt.pdf.
171. Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 254 (Alaska 2006).
172. Id. at 252. The court then recited that this included the following
information under section 47.30.837(d)(2) of the Alaska Statutes:
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helpful the Supreme Court of Minnesota’s holding that courts must balance
a “patient’s need for treatment against the intrusiveness of the prescribed
treatment” in order to determine whether a court should order the forced
administration of medical treatment and its approach sensible.173
If requiring the trial court to find forced drugging to be in the
respondent’s best interest is to have any meaning, the hospital has to
present evidence with respect to the foregoing and respondents have the
right to a meaningful opportunity to contest it. Thus, petitions for forced
medication should include sufficient factual allegations as to the
respondent’s best interests to justify the relief requested.
2. “Two-Step” Procedure Required by Myers & Wetherhorn. In Myers, the
Alaska Supreme Court held that involuntary commitments and courtordered forced medication are two separate steps: “To treat an unwilling
and involuntarily committed mental patient with psychotropic medication,
the state must initiate the second step of the process by filing a second

A. an explanation of the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis, or their
predominant symptoms, with and without the medication;
B. information about the proposed medication, its purpose, the method
of its administration, the recommended ranges of dosages, possible
side effects and benefits, ways to treat side effects, and risks of other
conditions, such as tardive dyskinesia;
C. a review of the patient’s history, including medication history and
previous side effects from medication;
D. an explanation of interactions with other drugs, including over-thecounter drugs, street drugs, and alcohol; and
E. information about alternative treatments and their risks, side effects,
and benefits, including the risks of nontreatment[.]
Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(2) (2006)).
173. Myers, 138 P.3d at 252 (quoting Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913
(Minn. 1976)). The specific factors Minnesota courts consider, which the Alaska
Supreme Court found sensible, are:
1.

the extent and duration of changes in behavior patterns and mental
activity effected by the treatment;
2. the risks of adverse side effects;
3. the experimental nature of the treatment;
4. its acceptance by the medical community of the state; and
5. the extent of intrusion into the patient’s body and the pain connected
with the treatment.
Meyers, 138 P.3d at 252.
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petition, asking the court to approve the treatment it proposes to give.”174
This principle was reiterated and explained as follows in Wetherhorn:
Unlike involuntary commitment petitions, there is no statutory
requirement that a hearing be held on a petition for the
involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs within
seventy-two hours of a respondent’s initial detention. The
expedited process required for involuntary commitment
proceedings is aimed at mitigating the infringement of the
respondent’s liberty rights that begins the moment the
respondent is detained involuntarily. In contrast, so long as no
drugs have been administered, the rights to liberty and privacy
implicated by the right to refuse psychotropic medications
remain intact. Therefore, in the absence of an emergency, there is
no reason why the statutory protections should be neglected in the
interests of speed.175
The supreme court’s explicit direction was ignored in a September 2007
forced drugging case under section 47.30.839 of the Alaska Statutes. Both
the hospital’s attorney and the Probate Master to whom the case was
referred through a standing order insisted that the proceeding be
completed on an expedited basis.176
Not only is it mandatory that trial courts comply with the direction that
careful consideration of court-ordered administration of medication not be
compromised in the interest of speed, it is also very beneficial to
respondents. Programs that medicate all patients immediately regardless of
patient input are not optimal for treating people diagnosed with serious
mental illness, nor are those that eschew drugs altogether; rather, the most
successful treatment programs selectively use drugs on a voluntary basis
after other efforts have failed.177 In other words, the most successful
programs first try non-drug approaches, giving the patient the opportunity
to recover without resorting to use of these problematic drugs. Thus, not
only is a more deliberate approach to deciding whether to authorize

174. Id. at 242–43.
175. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 381 (Alaska 2007)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
176. See Transcript of Proceedings, In re W.S.B., No. 3AN 07-1064 PR, p.14 (Aug.
31, 2007), available at http://psychrights.org/states/Alaska/CaseXX/3AN-071064PS/070831BBTranscript.pdf; Transcript of Proceedings, In re W.S.B., No. 3AN
07-1064 PR, pp 16–18, 23 (Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://psychrights.org/states/
Alaska/CaseXX/3AN-07-1064PS/070905TBBTranscript.pdf.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52.
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administration of medication in the courts mandated by Myers, it also
benefits many respondents by allowing those who may not need the drugs
the opportunity to recover. The evidence suggests that if this procedure is
followed with the employment of less intrusive alternatives, such as those
exemplified in these programs, chronicity could be at least halved.178
G. Right to Have the Hearings and Court Records Open to the Public
Parties to civil proceedings have the constitutional free speech right to
have the proceeding open to the public, and the public has its own free
speech right of access to civil proceedings.179 Like other fundamental
constitutional rights, this free speech right of access can be overridden only
by a showing of an important or compelling countervailing governmental
interest and that there are no less restrictive alternatives.180 There is also a
common law right of public access to civil trials.181 In short, “[a] trial is a
public event. What transpires in the court room is public property.”182
However, these common law rights can also be overridden in certain
circumstances, such as to protect privacy interests183 and to ensure the
integrity of the adjudicatory process.184
People who have jobs or go to school, have relationships and
reputations to protect, etc., have good reason to want to keep involuntary
commitment and forced drugging proceedings confidential. However,
many other psychiatric respondents, especially those who no longer have
any reputation to protect, want the world to know what is happening to
them. That is their right.
Section 47.30.735(b)(3) of the Alaska Statutes provides that in
commitment hearings, respondents have the right “to have the hearing
open or closed to the public as the respondent elects.”185 There is no default
provision that the hearing be either open or closed. Under the statute, the
election is required to determine whether the commitment hearing is to be

178. See, e.g., Harrow & Jobe, supra note 53, at 409.
179. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 21–22 (2d Cir. 1984).
180. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).
181. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
182. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
183. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 224 n.10 (3d Cir.
2002) (Scirica, J., dissenting).
184. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075–76 (1991).
185. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(b)(3) (2006). This right is incorporated into the 90and 180-day commitment hearings pursuant to section 47.30.745(a) and section
47.20.770(b) of the Alaska Statutes.
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open or closed.186 However, until PsychRights began representing
psychiatric respondents in involuntary commitment cases, the author
knows of no case in which an involuntary commitment respondent was
asked to make the required election and as far as the author knows all
commitment hearings under the current statute have been closed to the
public.187
It seems that to make an election to have the hearing open to the public
meaningful: (1) the required election must be made sufficiently in advance of
the hearing and (2) the hearing cannot be conducted behind the locked
doors of API.
With respect to forced drugging hearings, there is no statutory
authority to close them to the public. Any authority to do so must therefore
derive from some other source. There are sound privacy reasons why a
respondent’s request to close a forced drugging hearing justifies an
exception to the rule that court hearings are open to the public. By the same
token, however, if a respondent desires to have a forced drugging
proceeding open to the public, that seems virtually to be an absolute right.
In involuntary commitment (and forced drugging) cases, the only
cognizable interest in confidentiality is that of the psychiatric respondents.
Therefore, if a respondent wants the court proceedings open to the public,
this must be honored. One of the prime reasons for the right of public
access is to “[keep] a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies,”
including the courts.188 The conduct of these proceedings behind locked
doors for almost fifty years is one of the reasons they have strayed so far
from proper procedures, resulting in pervasive rights violations.
It seems self-evident that an election to have the “hearing” open to the
public includes the court file. Towards this end, one of the cases cited with
approval in Nixon is State ex rel Williston Herald, in which the court held the
right to have a “hearing” open to the public necessarily includes access to
the court file, subject to reasonable regulation.189 However, in a

186. Circumstances can be conceived in which the public’s constitutional and/or
common law rights in having a commitment hearing open to the public may
override the statutory right of a respondent to have it closed. While it seems
relatively remote that a news organization would assert such a right over the
objections of the respondent, it seems quite a bit more likely that family members
might assert such a right.
187. The author’s experience is in Anchorage, and it may be that respondents in
other locations are asked to make the required election and some hearings have
been open to the public.
188. Kamakana v. Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
189. 151 N.W.2d 758, 763 (N.D. 1967).
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PsychRights September 2007 forced drugging case,190 after the respondent
elected to have the hearing open to the public, the Probate Master sua
sponte issued an order that the file would be closed after a court clerk was
informed that someone was likely to come to look at the file.191
H. Right to Have the Hearing in a Real Courtroom
As set forth above, the author suggests that to make the right to have
the hearings open to the public meaningful, such “public” hearings cannot
be held behind the locked doors of API. In addition, section 47.30.735(b) of
the Alaska Statutes explicitly provides that “[t]he hearing shall be
conducted in a physical setting least likely to have a harmful effect on the
mental or physical health of the respondent, within practical limits.”192
PsychRights takes the position that this also means respondents normally
have the right to elect to have the hearing held in a real courtroom at the
courthouse.193
Currently, these “hearings” are conducted in a cramped conference
room at API without the trappings of a legitimate legal proceeding. This
leaves respondents feeling that they have not had their “day in court.”194 In

190. In re W.S.B., No. 3AN 07-1064 P/R (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2008).
191. Id. The superior court approved this order without analysis, other than “for
the reasons stated” in API’s motion to strike, and this is currently on appeal in
Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., No. S-13015 (Alaska filed July 17, 2007). The
rights violation was real. A reporter was interested in the case, and the Probate
Master’s sua sponte order closing the file precluded her access. Previously, at the
main hearing in the case, even though the respondent had elected in open court to
have the proceeding open to the public, the reporter found the courtroom locked
and left before it was discovered the courtroom door was improperly locked. Contra
In re William S. Bigley, No. 3AN 08-00247 P/R (Alaska Super. Ct. March 2008)
(public hearing granted).
192. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(b) (2006).
193. If a respondent’s choice to have the commitment hearing in a real
courtroom is contested, then a hearing must be held under section 47.30.735(b) of
the Alaska Statutes to determine whether it is the “physical setting least likely to
have a harmful effect on the mental or physical health of the respondent, within
practical limits.” Id.
194. In reality, they have not had a legitimate determination of their rights. That
these hearings do not have the trappings of legitimate judicial proceedings may
also contribute to the cavalier treatment of these proceedings by the other
participants, such as the probate masters and lawyers. In contrast, in March of 2008,
in In re William S. Bigley, No. 3AN 08-00247 P/R (Alaska Super. Ct. March 2008),
the respondent, who had previously been involuntarily committed many times and
was represented by the Alaska Public Defender Agency, elected to have his
involuntary commitment hearing held publicly. This public hearing was held
before a superior court judge, rather than in a closed proceeding before a master.
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the author’s experience, there are a host of negative consequences that flow
from this. For one thing, it can exacerbate the perception of some
respondents that people are out to get them.195 Similarly, since they do not
feel it was a legitimate judicial process, it can solidify their resistance to
cooperating with hospital staff.
I.

The Required Time Frame for Involuntary Commitment Precludes
Proper Processing by Masters

In Anchorage, as of the date of writing, involuntary commitment and
forced drugging cases are most often heard by probate masters, putatively
under the authority granted in section 2(a) of the Alaska Rules of Probate
Procedure allowing a standing referral. It is suggested here, however, that
because of the extremely short time frames in which involuntary
commitment decisions must be made,196 especially for thirty-day
commitments,197 it is not possible for these cases to be handled properly in
this way. Implicitly recognizing this, section 2(b)(3)(C) of the Alaska Rules
of Probate Procedure provides that involuntary commitments are effective
pending superior court review.198 However, this is improper. Probate
masters only have authority to make recommendations for court
acceptance, modification, or rejection.199 By making involuntary
commitments effective pending review, section 2(b)(3)(C) of the Alaska
Rules of Probate Procedure effectively eliminates the requirement of
superior court approval.
One reason it is not possible to properly handle these cases in a timely
manner by referrals to masters is that section 2(f)(1) of the Alaska Rules of
Probate Procedure allows ten days to object to the master’s report and a
reply to such objections within 3 days of service of the objections.200 This
time frame renders meaningless respondents’ right to have the superior
court determine whether they should be committed. Indeed, half of the
initial commitment period may have already expired before the question is

The judge took the case very seriously, applied the law to the facts presented, and
found the respondent to not be gravely disabled. See id.
195. In fact, the whole involuntary commitment and forced drugging process can
legitimately be perceived that way.
196. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.725(b) (2006); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.745(c),(d),(g)
(2006); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.770(b) (2006).
197. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.725(b).
198. ALASKA PROBATE R. 2(b)(3)(C) (2006).
199. See ALASKA PROBATE R. 2(e) (2006).
200. ALASKA PROBATE R. 2(f)(1) (2006).
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even ripe for decision by the superior court. In a case brought at the end of
February 2007, the superior court granted the commitment petition before
the objections were filed, and the objections were not even ruled upon until
the start of the ninety-day commitment hearing.201
Another reason it is not possible to properly handle these cases in a
timely manner by referrals to masters is because section 53(d)(1) of the
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a transcript accompany the
masters reports,202 and this can not be done as a practical matter within the
required timeframes. The requirement for a transcript has simply been
ignored.203
J.

Probate Rule 2(b)(3)(D) Is Invalid

Section 2(b)(3)(D) of the Alaska Rules of Probate Procedure provides
that a probate master’s recommendation that a forced drugging petition be
granted is effective pending superior court review.204 Whether or not this
procedure was ever proper, Myers implicitly invalidates the practice. In
Myers, the Supreme Court of Alaska was very explicit that no nonemergency forced drugging could occur without court approval after
careful consideration of the fundamental liberty interests involved,
including the constitutionally required best interests and no less intrusive
alternative determinations.205 There is no such court determination prior to
a superior court decision.

VII. PROPER EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
As previously set forth, the United States Supreme Court has
unequivocally held that involuntary commitment may not constitutionally
take place except pursuant to proper evidentiary standards.206 There is
every reason to believe the Alaska Supreme Court would hold at least as
much under the Alaska Constitution with respect to involuntary
commitment, as well as forced drugging proceedings. If so, the court

201. In re W.S.B., 3 AN 07-0247 (Alaska Superior Ct. 2007).
202. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 53(d)(1).
203. This was confirmed by the judge and assistant attorney general in March of
2007. In re W.S.B., No. 3AN 07-247 P/R (Alaska Super. Ct. 2007). This failure to
comply with Civil Rule 53(d)(1) is on appeal in Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst.,
No. S-12677 (Alaska filed July 17, 2007).
204. See ALASKA PROBATE R. 2(b)(3)(D) (2006).
205. See Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 243 (Alaska 2006).
206. See supra Part IV.
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would presumably hold that proper evidentiary standards must be
employed in presenting evidence with respect to such issues as the
respondent’s dangerousness and capacity to decline the drugs and whether
the forced drugging is in the “best interests” of the respondent.
In State v. Coon, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the United States
Supreme Court’s revised standard for expert scientific opinion testimony
as laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.207 Under Alaska
expert opinion testimony law, in order for “scientific” expert testimony to
be admissible, the court must consider certain reliability factors prior to
admitting the testimony. Factors to consider may include:
(1) whether the proffered scientific theory or technique can be
(and has been) empirically tested (i.e., whether the scientific
method is falsifiable and refutable); (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subject to peer review and publication; (3)
whether the known or potential error rate of the theory or
technique is acceptable, and whether the existence and
maintenance of standards controls the technique’s operation; and
(4) whether the theory or technique has attained general
acceptance.208
In Marron v. Stromstad, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the United
States Supreme Court’s extension of the Daubert standard to all “‘technical’
or ‘other specialized’ knowledge” in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.209 In
rejecting a “Coon-Daubert analysis” for experience-based expert testimony,
the Alaska Supreme Court held that other Alaska Rules of Evidence must
be complied with to ensure reliability.210 These include proper
qualification211 and that the type of data utilized must be reasonably relied
upon.212 In addition, the court relied on the following as “the basic pillars
of the adversary system” to ensure reliability and proper consideration:
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and

207. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 388 (Alaska 1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
208. Id. at 395.
209. Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1004 (Alaska 2005) (“[W]e limit our
application of Daubert to expert testimony based on scientific theory, as opposed to
testimony based upon the expert’s personal experience.”) (referencing Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)).
210. Id. at 1007.
211. ALASKA R. EVID. 702(a).
212. ALASKA R. EVID. 703.
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careful instruction on the burden of proof” as “the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”213
The distinction between scientific evidence requiring a “Coon/Daubert
analysis” and experience-based expertise which does not is a critical one,
because the psychiatrists called by the hospital in favor of involuntary
commitment and forced drugging petitions are asked to provide expert
opinions in both categories.214 Instead of any recognition of the distinction,
they are uniformly qualified as “experts in psychiatry” and allowed to
testify with respect to scientific knowledge without compliance with
Coon.215
To a large extent, involuntary commitment—explicitly—and forced
drugging—in actuality—are fear-based proceedings. Some of this is based
on legitimate fears regarding the person’s safety, especially by family
members. However, they are also very often based on the erroneous
belief—fueled by tragic, well-publicized incidents—that people diagnosed
with mental illness tend to be very dangerous, violent individuals. The
scientific debate is over whether there is even a slight correlation between
mental illness and violence216 or whether there is only a greater-thanchance relationship between mental illness and violence.217 With respect to
the latter, since studies demonstrate that psychiatric drugs cause violence,
it appears highly likely that any correlation between mental illness and
commission of violent acts above the rate in the general population is a
result of the psychiatric drugs, rather than any underlying mental illness.218

213. Marron, 123 P.3d at 1007 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 596 (1993)). However, the Alaska Supreme Court’s reliance in Marron on
these “basic pillars of the adversary system” is misplaced for involuntary
commitment and forced drugging cases as they are currently conducted. It requires
a truly adversarial process, which has not existed in these cases. This is, in truth, the
place where the legal system in these cases is most broken. This is further
addressed infra Part VIII.B.
214. One example is whether a respondent exhibits symptoms of Tardive
Dyskinesia, as opposed to the rate at which Tardive Dyskinesia occurs.
215. See generally State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999) (involving a dispute
over voice spectrographic analysis as evidence).
216. Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 733 (1974).
217. See John Monahan, The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial
Predictions of Violence, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY 423, 441 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002) (“[T]here appears to
be a greater-than-chance relationship between mental disorder and violent
behavior.”).
218. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Rather than acceding to an irrational mob mentality to lock up and
drug people found to be mentally ill, courts must insist that such
deprivations of the fundamental right to liberty occur only when the legal
predicates are truly met. This includes proper evidentiary gate-keeping to
ensure reliability to guard against erroneous deprivations of liberty. Three
key factual issues where improper and unreliable scientific opinion is
regularly allowed are dangerousness, capacity (competency), and best
interests.
A. Dangerousness
As previously set forth, under both the United States and Alaska
constitutions, a person may not be committed unless he or she has been
found by clear and convincing evidence to be dangerous to others or self
(which includes being unable to survive safely in freedom).219 Historically,
psychiatrists’ predictions of dangerousness have been recognized as totally
unreliable:
The voluminous literature as to the ability of psychiatrists (or
other mental health professionals) to testify reliably as to an
individual’s dangerousness in the indeterminate future had been
virtually unanimous: “psychiatrists have absolutely no expertise
in predicting dangerous behavior—indeed, they may be less
accurate predictors than laymen—and that they usually err by
overpredicting violence.220
Some of the leading research was performed by Ennis and Litwick who
concluded: “In summary, training and experience do not enable
psychiatrists adequately to predict dangerous behavior.”221
A tremendous amount of work and research was subsequently done to
improve this dismal performance. In 2003, Professor Alexander Scherr of
the University of Georgia School of Law reviewed the science behind
predictions of dangerousness:
The opinions of experts in prediction should help the courts in
this task, but over thirty years of commentary, judicial opinion,
and scientific review argue that predictions of danger lack
scientific rigor. . . . The American Psychiatric Association has
argued to the [United States Supreme] Court that “[t]he

219. See supra Parts II.B, V.
220. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 27, § 2.A-4.3c, at 109.
221. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 216, at 733.
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professional literature uniformly establishes that such
predictions are fundamentally of very low reliability.” . . . The
sharpest critique finds that mental health professionals perform
no better than chance at predicting violence, and perhaps
perform even worse.
....
Clinical opinions have never received high marks for reliability.
Early literature and studies almost completely discounted them,
finding that clinicians did little better than chance. A 1981 study
by John Monahan, an early critic of predictive accuracy,
summarized these studies, and critiqued their methodological
shortcomings, resulting in a “second generation” of research into
the accuracy of clinical methods. Over the past decade, these
second generation research methods have led to a conclusion
that clinical methods perform somewhat better than random, but
are still deeply imperfect. Assessments that incorporate actuarial
data appear to have performed somewhat better than unguided
and particularly unstructured assessments, increasing the rate of
reliability from 1 in 3 to 1 in 2. Overall, Monahan concluded that
“the sober conclusion that clinicians are ‘modestly better than
chance’ at predicting violence appears to be becoming the
consensus view.” 222
Whether proffered expert testimony on dangerousness is properly
admitted under Coon and Marron should be tested by attorneys
representing psychiatric respondents. Motions in limine should be filed in
advance of the testimony being proffered. Marron made clear that even
though the Daubert standards are not required for experience-based expert
opinion testimony, the trial court is still obligated to “ensure that it is
relevant and reliable.”223
In Samaniego v. City of Kodiak, citing Coon, the Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s allowance of certain psychological testimony by
taking judicial notice of its reliability as follows: “[P]sychological and
psychiatric evaluations, including clinical interviews . . . are longrecognized techniques that have been empirically tested, subject[ed] to
extensive peer review and publication, and generally accepted in the

222. Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil
Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2, 17–18 (2003).
223. Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1007 (Alaska 2005).
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psychological community.”224 As the court further held, “A bare claim that
psychiatric evidence is unreliable does not subject forensic psychiatry to a
mini-trial in every case.”225
In Coon, after authorizing judicial notice for expert testimony “when an
area of expertise is well-known and has been fully considered by the
courts,” the Alaska Supreme Court noted that even this can be challenged
by “affirmative evidence of unreliability.”226 Even if dangerousness
testimony is “an area of expertise that is well-known and has been fully
considered by the courts,” a dubious proposition, just such affirmative
evidence of unreliability as to such testimony is set forth above in this
section.
As previously shown, clinical judgments, which might be authorized
by Marron, are no better than chance.227 Legitimate actuarial approaches
perform somewhat better, but, at best, are wrong half the time.228 It is
difficult to see how even fifty percent reliability can meet the required clear
and convincing proof standard of dangerousness—yet, as a result of this
unreliable testimony, the courts commit people involuntarily on the
grounds that they are dangerous. As Professor Perlin notes:
[C]ourts accept . . . testimonial dishonesty, . . . specifically where
witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a “high propensity
to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired
ends.”
....
Experts . . . openly subvert statutory and case law criteria that
impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for
commitment . . . .
This combination . . . helps define a system in which (1)
dishonest testimony is often regularly (and unthinkingly)
accepted; (2) statutory and case law standards are frequently
subverted; and (3) insurmountable barriers are raised to insure
that the allegedly “therapeutically correct” social end is met . . . .
In short, the mental disability law system often deprives

224. Samaniego v. City of Kodiak, 80 P.3d 216, 219–20 (Alaska 2003) (quoting the
trial court).
225. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
226. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 398 (Alaska 1999).
227. Scherr, supra note 222, at 2.
228. Id. at 17–18.
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individuals of liberty disingenuously and upon bases that have
no relationship to case law or to statutes.229
The logical conclusion, then, is that most psychiatric respondents are
not being locked up because they are truly dangerous (or gravely
disabled). Instead, many are being locked up because they are bothering
people, because people disapprove of their lifestyles, or because the
judicial system does not know what else to do with them. However, there
are proven alternative approaches available for treating people
experiencing these problems that result in much better outcomes overall.230
By engaging in the traditional adversarial process, the courts—and
especially the lawyers representing psychiatric respondents—will be the
instruments of justice they should be, and the mental health system will be
encouraged to adopt an approach more like Dr. Mosher’s, who in forty
years of active psychiatric practice with countless un-medicated people
experiencing psychosis, never had to commit even one of them.231 It is
suggested here that this is not only required from the legal perspective, but
it is also the right thing therapeutically.
B.

Capacity

Under section 47.30.839(g) of the Alaska Statutes, if the court
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the patient does not have
the capacity to provide informed consent to either accept or decline the
recommended medication and “was not competent to provide informed
consent at the time of previously expressed wishes,” “the court shall
approve the facility’s proposed use of psychotropic medication.”232
Otherwise, under section 47.30.839(f) of the Alaska Statutes, the court must
honor the patient’s decision about the use of psychotropic medication.233
As with dangerousness, there is also a body of science surrounding the
issue of capacity to decline or refuse psychotropic medications and
validated instruments developed to assess it, which is most often referred

229. Perlin, supra note 28, at 32–34.
230. See supra Part III.A, C.
231. Cf. Transcript of Record at 178, In re Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., No.
3AN 03-277 P/S (Alaska Super. Ct. 2003), available at http://psychrights.org/
States/Alaska/CaseOne/30-Day/3-5and10-03transcript.htm.
232. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(g) (2006). In Myers, the Alaska Supreme Court
additionally required findings that the forced drugging was in the patient’s best
interests and there is no less intrusive alternative in order for this statute to be
constitutional. Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 248 (Alaska 2006).
233. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(f) (2006).
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to as competency.234 Professor Perlin summarized the scientific findings,
noting, “mental patients . . . are not inherently more incompetent than
nonmentally ill medical patients.”235
Section 47.30.837 of the Alaska Statutes sets forth the statutory
standard for competency, which it phrases as the capacity to provide
informed consent.236 A key point is that a person must be competent to
accept the medication as well as decline it.237 In practice, as admitted by Dr.
Hanowell at his deposition in the Myers case, if the patient accepts the
medication, the hospital deems her competent, but if the patient refuses,
the hospital says she is incompetent.238 In other words, disagreement with
the psychiatrist’s desire to administer the drugs gives rise to testimony that
the person is incompetent, not any legitimate evaluation of competence.
Alaska law provides what is supposed to be a more neutral process.
Under section 47.30.839(d) of the Alaska Statutes, the court is to direct the
Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) to provide a visitor to, among other
things, assist the court in investigating whether the respondent has
capacity to give informed consent, including the patient’s response to a
capacity assessment instrument.239 The Alaska Supreme Court in
Wetherhorn found performance of these requirements to be “essential to the
court’s mandatory duty to determine whether the patient is presently
competent to provide informed consent” and the failure to do so plain
error.240 Unfortunately, the author’s experience has been that court visitors

234. However, a fundamental problem with even the scientific work around
competency to decline psychotropic drugs is that it starts with the assumption that
a decision to decline the medication is a bad decision and the question is thus when
should a person be allowed to make a bad decision. As set forth in Part III.D,
however, a decision to decline the drugs, especially without first trying other
approaches can, in fact, be a very good one. Additionally, these instruments assume
the doctor is providing accurate information, which is often not a valid assumption
with respect to psychotropic medications.
235. Perlin, supra note 29, at 746–47.
236. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837 (2006).
237. ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.836(1), (3) (2006).
238. See Deposition of Robert Hanowell, MD at 36–43, In re Faith J. Myers, No.
3AN-03-277 P/S (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), available at
http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseOne/30-Day/Hanowelldepo.htm. It is
worth noting that many patients know from their own experience and research that
the drugs are very harmful to them. When this is expressed, it is not only
considered evidence of incompetence, but also cited as evidence of their mental
illness.
239. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(d) (2006).
240. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 382 (Alaska 2007).
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do not execute their responsibilities in a valid manner.241 The “capacity
assessment instrument” being utilized was just made up by a court visitor
and has never been validated.242 The current competency determinations,
at least in Anchorage, are therefore the product of testimony that has no
evidentiary reliability. There are, however, capacity assessment
instruments that have been developed for determination of competence to
make treatment decisions that have been subjected to critical review as to
their validity, strengths, and weaknesses.243
C.

Best Interests

The best interests determination required by Myers directly presents
the Coon/Marron dichotomy between science-based testimony and
experience-based testimony. For example, testimony about the
effectiveness and negative effects of the neuroleptics is science-based and
any such testimony on behalf of the hospital, or the respondent for that
matter, is subject to a Coon/Daubert analysis. Testimony based on the
experience of the witness does not require a Coon/Daubert analysis, but
must still pass the reliability standards required in Marron and must be
recognized by the court as restricted to the witness’s experience.
Part III presents the scientific evidence regarding the neuroleptics. This
evidence should be presented on behalf of forced drugging petition
respondents and hospital psychiatrists required to address it with scientific
evidence if they can. In doing that, respondents are entitled to know what
scientific studies, etc., will be offered against them in order to be able to
prepare—just as in all other proceedings.

241. The author understands the reason why the court visitors had not complied
with the statute in Wetherhorn is that the assistant public defenders had long before
prohibited them from interviewing their psychiatric respondent clients because the
assessments were considered biased. The court uniformly appointed court visitors
to perform their statutory duties, this was uniformly ignored, the public defenders
never noted the deficiency, and the court never did anything about it.
242. This “capacity assessment instrument” consists of questions ranging from
“What is your name?” to “Do you take medications?” to “Have you ever heard of
informed consent?”
243. See THOMAS GRISSO ET AL., EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS
AND INSTRUMENTS 404–50 (2d ed. 2003) (describing eight different capacity
assessment instruments).
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VIII. OTHER IMPORTANT RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. Failure to Provide Available Less Intrusive Alternatives
One of the core holdings of Myers is that the State may not forcibly
drug someone with psychotropic medication(s) against their wishes unless
“no less intrusive alternative treatment is available.”244 The word,
“available,” however, is ambiguous. Does it mean the State is required to
fund a proven alternative, or does it mean the State may avoid providing a
viable less intrusive alternative by deciding to not fund it? Based on the
following analysis, the answer appears to be the former.
In Wyatt v. Stickney, a district court in Alabama required the State of
Alabama to provide constitutionally required services to institutionalized
persons, holding that “no default can be justified by a want of operating
funds.”245 This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Wyatt v. Anderholt, which held that the state legislature is not free to
provide social services in a way that denies constitutional rights.246 In
Wyatt, therefore, the federal courts required the State of Alabama to spend
funds in specific ways to provide constitutionally adequate services.
In Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School System, in considering an Equal
Protection claim regarding the right to state funding of local schools, the
Alaska Supreme Court held that resolution of the complex problems
pertaining to the location and quality of secondary education are best
determined by the legislative process, but went on to state: “We shall not,
however, hesitate to intervene if a violation of the constitutional rights to
equal treatment under either the Alaska or [United States] Constitutions is
established.”247
Presumably, the Alaska Supreme Court would also not hesitate to
order the provision of an available less intrusive alternative to satisfy the
constitutional due process right to a less intrusive alternative it required in
Myers. There would likely be some limitation on the State’s obligation to
provide less intrusive alternatives, such as extreme cost, but if the State can
reasonably provide a less intrusive alternative, it should not
constitutionally forcibly drug the person instead.

244.
245.
246.
247.

Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 239 (Alaska 2006).
344 F.Supp. 387, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
503 F.2d 1305, 1315 (5th Cir. 1974).
536 P.2d 793, 808–09 (Alaska 1975).
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Zealous Representation Should Be Provided to Psychiatric
Respondents

The trial process relies on a truly adversarial system to function
properly. The failure of psychiatric respondents to receive effective
representation is where the legal process is most broken. If psychiatric
respondents’ rights were being zealously represented, which is their
lawyers’ ethical responsibility,248 including thorough prosecution of
appeals,249 the above-described pervasive rights violations would
presumably be corrected. Requiring proper representation was the main
objective of the Wetherhorn appeal, but the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that a challenge to effectiveness of counsel under state law must be made
through a separate proceeding, such as section 60(b) of the Alaska Rules of
Civil Procedure or habeas corpus, rather than through direct appeal.250
In In re K.G.F., the Montana Supreme Court recognized and addressed
the systemic failure of involuntary commitment respondents to receive
effective assistance of counsel:
As a starting point, it is safe to say that in purportedly protecting
the due process rights of an individual subject to an involuntary
commitment proceeding—whereby counsel typically has less
than [twenty-four] hours to prepare for a hearing on a State
petition that seeks to sever or infringe upon the individual’s
relations with family, friends, physicians, and employment for
three months or longer—our legal system of judges, lawyers, and
clinicians has seemingly lost its way in vigilantly protecting the
fundamental rights of such individuals.251
The K.G.F. court then went on to articulate five specific, but not
exclusive, requirements for effective representation: (1) Appointment of
Competent Counsel, which requires that the attorney have an
“understanding of the legal process of involuntary commitments, as well
as the range of alternative, less-restrictive treatment and care options

248. ALASKA R. OF PROF. CONDUCT pmbl. (“[A] lawyer zealously asserts the
client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”).
249. In briefing over attorneys’ fees before the Alaska Supreme Court in
Wetherhorn, the State conceded that it was obligated to pay for such appeals by the
Public Defender Agency. See Responsive Supplemental Briefing Re: Application for
Full Reasonable Fees at 12–13, Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., No. 3AN-050459 PR (Alaska June 29, 2007), available at http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/
CaseFour/AttysFees/StateResp2SuppMemo.pdf.
250. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 384 (Alaska 2007).
251. In re K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 492–93 (Mont. 2001) (emphasis added).
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available;”252 (2) Initial Investigation, which requires the attorney to, at
minimum, acquire information about “the patient’s prior medical history
and treatment [if relevant] . . . , the patient’s relationship to family and
friends within the community, and the patient’s relationship with all
relevant medical professionals involved prior to and during the petition
process;” 253 (3) The Client Interview, which “should be conducted in private
and should be held sufficiently before any scheduled hearings to permit
effective preparation and prehearing assistance to the client;”254 (4) The
Right to Remain Silent, which includes the basic requirement that “[a]ny
waiver of right to remain silent to be interviewed by a hospital psychiatrist
must be knowing and counsel is entitled to be at such an interview;”255 and
(5) Counsel as an Advocate and Adversary, which instructs that “the proper
role of the attorney is to ‘represent the perspective of the respondent and to
serve as a vigorous advocate for the respondent’s wishes.’”256 In addition,
“[i]n the courtroom, an attorney should engage in all aspects of advocacy
and vigorously argue to the best of his or her ability for the ends desired by
the client.”257
Presumably, because Montana law provides psychiatric respondents
with the right to have the state pay for an independent evaluation under
section 53-21-118 of the Montana Code,258 the Montana Supreme Court did
not specifically identify it. In Alaska, an indigent does not have the right to
such appointed expert at a thirty-day commitment hearing under section
47.30.735 of the Alaska Statutes,259 but does have such a right for
subsequent commitments under sections 47.30.745(e) and 47.30.770(b) of
the Alaska Statutes.260 However, it is absolutely critical that such an
independent expert witness also be available to psychiatric respondents for
the initial thirty-day commitment hearing, especially with respect to a 30-

252. Id. at 498.
253. Id. at 498–99. Additionally, “counsel should also attempt to interview all
persons who have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commitment
petition, including family members, acquaintances and any other persons identified
by the client as having relevant information, and be prepared to call such persons
as witnesses.” Id.
254. Id. at 499 (citation omitted). Additionally, “counsel should also ascertain, if
possible, a clear understanding of what the client would like to see happen in the
forthcoming commitment proceedings.” Id.
255. Id. at 499–500.
256. Id. at 500 (citation omitted).
257. Id.
258. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-118(2) (2007).
259. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735 (2006).
260. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.745(e) (2006); see ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.770(b) (2006).
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day forced drugging petition, because this is where many respondents are
channeled into chronicity. As Professor Perlin notes, “attorneys will need
to employ independent psychiatric (or other medical disability) experts in a
significant percentage of such cases,”261 and cites to Practice Manual:
Preparation and Trial of a Civil Commitment Case262 for the following
proposition: “Such an expert will probably be ‘[t]he single most valuable
person to testify on behalf of a client in a contested commitment
hearing.’”263
Attorneys defending these cases should virtually always, if not always,
have an expert, or experts, testify on behalf of psychiatric respondents. In
Marron, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on the presentation of contrary
expert testimony evidence as one of “the traditional and appropriate means
of attacking shaky but admissible evidence” in holding a Daubert/Coon
analysis was not required for expert opinion testimony based on
experience. In the author’s experience, such testimony is virtually never
offered by the Public Defender Agency, even though, as set forth above,
the validity of the hospital’s testimony is often dubious at best. Experts
should present evidence about these drugs’ true rate of efficacy and
potential harmfulness to rebut: (1) testimony of hospital psychiatrists
generally; (2) testimony as to whether the respondent is properly
diagnosed as mentally ill under the statute,264 a danger to self or others, or
gravely disabled; and (3) testimony as to whether the respondent has the
capacity to decline medication. In addition, attorneys should be looking to
have fact witnesses, such as friends, employers, family members, etc.,
called as witnesses when they will support their clients’ cases. This
requires investigational efforts prior to the hearing.
To the extent the assistant public defenders call no witnesses at all and
cross-examination of the hospital’s witness, or witnesses, is lackadaisical or
worse, using the Alaska Supreme Court’s words, these “pillars of the
adversary system”265 are absent. The result, as Professor Perlin puts it, is a
system that “deprives individuals of liberty disingenuously and upon
bases that have no relationship to case law or to statutes.”266

261. Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 703 (2003).
262. Franklin J. Hickman et al., Practice Manual: Preparation and Trial of a Civil
Commitment Case, 5 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 281, 289 (1981).
263. Perlin, supra note 261, at 703 n.118 (alterations in the original).
264. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(12) (2006) (defining mental illness).
265. Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1007 (Alaska 2005).
266. Perlin, supra note 28, at 34.

02__GOTTSTEIN.DOC

100

5/27/2008 1:40:11 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 25:51

IX. THE STATE OF ALASKA
SHOULD EMBRACE THE CONCEPTS PRESENTED HERE
The State should implement the concepts set forth here, both as to the
legal proceedings and its mental health program. Unfortunately, the State
of Alaska’s legislative and executive branches have refused to even discuss
these rights violations, therefore leaving litigation as the only option thus
far. Letters and e-mails have been sent to the Attorney General requesting
substantive discussions and a briefing given to the Judiciary Committees of
the Alaska Legislature along the same lines,267 but the Attorney General
has refused to respond as of the date of this writing. 268
The current system is truly irrational. In addition to the tremendous
amount of unnecessary suffering it creates, it reduces rather than increases
public safety, increases chronicity, and imposes substantial unnecessary
costs upon the government.
A. The Current Paradigm Increases Rather than Decreases Violence
As set forth above, the scientific evidence is clear that the drugs
themselves increase, rather than reduce, violence.269 In addition, psychiatric
respondents experience unwarranted violence, such as being strapped
down to a bed for hours and drugged against their will.270 The police,
pursuant to ex parte orders, show up without notice and usually handcuff
the respondents for transport to the hospital. If any protest is made, as
police are trained to do, the respondents are physically subdued,271
sometimes with injuries.

267. See, e.g., Briefing Points from James B. Gottstein, to Jay Ramras, Chair,
House Judiciary Comm.; Hollis French, Chair, Senate Judiciary Comm; and Talis
Colberg, Attorney Gen. (February 7, 2007), available at http://psychrights.org/
States/Alaska/Legislature/2-8-07JudiciaryBrfng.pdf.
268. Alaska Supreme Court Chief Justice Fabe, however, has recognized there
are at least procedural issues to be addressed and, in June of 2007, appointed a
Probate Rules Subcommittee on Involuntary Commitments and the Involuntary
Administration of Psychotropic Medication to make recommendations with respect
to revising the procedural rules governing these cases.
269. See, e.g., Van Putten, supra note 58, at 43–46 (describing manifestations of
akathisia and how neuroleptic drugs can be a cause); Herrera, supra note 60, at 558–
61 (suggesting that haloperidol can increase violence in patients); Galynker &
Nazarian, supra note 60, at 31–32.
270. See Cusack et al., supra note 140, at 456–57 (discussing results from a
questionnaire about trauma and harm in psychiatric settings).
271. At the urging of the Anchorage chapter of the National Alliance on Mental
Illness (NAMI), and with the financial support of the Alaska Mental Health Trust
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Forced drugging is experienced as torture by those forced to endure it,
and internationally, human rights activists assert it is a violation of the
universal prohibition against torture.272 When the former Soviet Union
gave this class of drugs to political prisoners, the international community
decried it as torture.273 Being a mental patient does not change the
experience of being on the sharp end of the hypodermic. If a patient does
not take prescribed drugs, four or five staff members will physically
subdue the person and inject him or her with drugs.274 As noted above, the
Alaska Supreme Court has equated forced medication with the
intrusiveness of lobotomy and electroshock.275 When one considers that
this is experienced by psychiatric respondents as serious, unwarranted
violence against them, it is understandable that physical resistance will
sometimes result. This can be viewed as a “fight or flight” scenario in
which the physical flight option has been taken away.276
B.

A System that Maximizes Voluntariness Is Far More Successful

It is only natural that people who are forced to undergo these types of
treatment will avoid them.277 There are many people who choose

Authority, the Anchorage Police Department, and other Alaska police departments
are to be commended for instituting what is known as a “Crisis Intervention Team”
(CIT). Under CIT, certain police officers are trained to de-escalate situations with
people engaging in disturbing behavior attributed to symptoms of mental illness.
These CIT officers are dispatched to applicable situations when available, and this
approach has reduced the violence associated with police interactions. More
information on the CIT approach, which was developed in Memphis after a
mentally ill person was unnecessarily killed by police, can be found at Memphis
Police Department, The Crisis Intervention Team Model, http://akmhcweb.org/docs/
TheCrisisInterventionTeamModel.pdf.
272. See Tina Minkowitz, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and the Right to Be Free From Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions,
34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 405 (2007) (classifying forced psychiatric
interventions as torture).
273. See Carl Gershman, Psychiatric Abuse in the Soviet Union, 21 SOCIETY 54, 57
(July 1984).
274. See, e.g., Transcript of Deposition of William Worrall, M.D. at 9, In re W.S.B.,
No. 3AN 07-247 P/R, March 30, 2007.
275. See supra Part III.
276. Faced with this, it is not unusual for patients to withdraw into themselves
as the only “flight” option. It seems worth noting that either response—i.e., (1)
physical resistance or (2) withdrawal, an extreme form of which would be
described as catatonia—will be labeled a symptom of mental illness.
277. This was recognized by the Washington Supreme Court in In re Harris, 654
P.2d 109, 115 (Wash. 1982) (“If commitment is always associated with force, those
who need help may be diverted from seeking assistance. . . . Ms. Harris’ only
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homelessness over engagement with the mental health system.278 In the
PsychRights’ September 2007 forced drugging case, Sarah Porter, an expert
from New Zealand who brought an alternate approach to fruition there,
happened to be in Anchorage and available to testify about the benefits of
voluntariness:
A. I’ve worked in the mental health [field] in New Zealand for
the last [fifteen] years in a variety of roles. I’m currently
employed as a strategic advisor by the Capital and Coast District
Health Board.
I also have . . .
. . . set up and run a program in New Zealand which operates as
an alternative to acute mental health services. . . . That’s been
operating since December last year, so it’s a relatively new
program, but our outcomes to date have been outstanding, and
the funding body that provided . . . the resources to do the
program is extremely excited about the results that we’ve been
able to achieve, with people receiving the service and helping us
to assist and [starting] out more similar programs in New
Zealand.
....
Q. Is there a philosophy that you might describe . . . that would
go along with this kind of alternative approach?
A. The way that I would describe that is that it’s—it’s really
about relationships. It’s about building a good therapeutic
relationship with the person in distress and supporting that
person to recognize and come to terms with the issues that are
going on in their life, in such a way that builds a therapeutic
alliance and is based on negotiation, rather than the use of force
or coercion, primarily . . . because we recognize that the use of
force and coercion actually undermines the therapeutic
relationship and decreases the likelihood of compliance in the
long term with whatever kinds of treatment or support has been
implicated for the person. So we have created and set up our
service along the lines of making relationship and negotiation the
primary basis for working with the person and supporting the

previous commitment experience was involuntary, and it left her with a lasting fear
of commitment. It is not surprising that she became a fugitive when ordered to
report to the hospital.”).
278. Because of the extreme negatives of psychiatric imprisonment and forced
drugging, this should not be assumed to be an irrational choice.
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person to reflect on and reconsider what’s going on to create
what might be defined as a crisis, and to devise strategies and
plans for how the person might be with the issues and challenges
that they face in their life.
....
Q. Now, you mentioned—I think you said that coercion creates
problems. Could you describe those kind of problems?
A. Well, that’s really about the fact that [there is] growing
recognition—I think worldwide, but particularly in New
Zealand, that coercion, itself, creates trauma and further distress
for the person, and that that, in itself, actually undermines the
benefits of the treatment that is being provided in a forced
context. And so our aiming and teaching is to be able to support
the person to resolve the issues without actually having to
trample . . . on the person’s autonomy, or hound them physically
or emotionally in doing so.
....
Q. And—and have you seen success in that approach?
A. We have. It’s been phenomenal, actually. . . . I had high hopes
that it would work, but I’ve . . . been really impressed how well,
in fact, it has worked . . . .279
C.

A System that Minimizes Force in Favor of Recovery Is Far Less
Expensive Overall

As set forth above, if psychiatric drugs were used more selectively and
the types of alternative approaches described above were used, it appears
the chronicity rate would be at least halved.280 Virtually all of the people
who are involuntarily committed are put on psychiatric drugs and labeled
as disabled, which ensures that they are able to receive medical, mental
health, and social security benefits. Providing these benefits, not
surprisingly, is very costly. Halving the number of people going down this
route would result in substantial avoided costs. In its Budget Summit
Report in August of 2003, the Alaska Mental Health Board acknowledged

279. Proceedings for 30-Day Commitment Hearing at 73–81, In re
The Necessity for the Hospitalization of W.S.B., No. 3AN-07-1064 PR (D. Alaska
Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://psychrights.org/states/Alaska/CaseXX/3AN-071064PS/070905TBBTranscript.pdf.
280. See supra Part III.C.
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that psychiatric medications appeared to be increasing chronicity,281 that
“[i]t is being accepted around the country that recovery from mental illness
is possible for many people that have previously been considered to be
destined to a life of great disability,”282 and
[s]ince placement on SSDI and SSI are criterion for receiving
Medicaid services, and . . . people have to be both disabled and
very poor to be in these programs, the clear result of this funding
mechanism is that the Medicaid/SSDI/SSI eligibility and funding
mechanism is . . . a one way ticket to permanent disability and poverty.
283

It need not be so. By implementing the types of programs described in
Part III(C) of this Article, it appears at least half of the people who now are
given this one way ticket to permanent disability and poverty could
recover and change their life trajectory towards being productive citizens
with meaningful, fulfilling lives. Thus, not only will there be substantial
fiscal benefits to the State, but it is the right thing to do.

X. CONCLUSION
In Myers and Wetherhorn, the Alaska Supreme Court demonstrated how
seriously it takes mental disability law issues. As shown above, for various
reasons, the same cannot be said to be true in Alaska’s trial courts. By
abandoning the traditional adversarial approach in favor of a paternalistic
one—where both the trial court judges and the lawyers assigned to
represent psychiatric respondents assume what the State wants to do to
psychiatric respondents is in their best interest—the State’s proposed
actions are not subjected to the normal litigation crucible. The critical
evidence presented in this Article showing that oftentimes what the State
wants to do is not in the person’s best interest is not being presented to the
courts. This is not a legitimate judicial process. The courts should not
engage in what is essentially a mock judicial process. It discredits the
judiciary and justifiably creates cynicism regarding the judicial system
among psychiatric respondents. It also causes great harm.

281. ALASKA MENTAL HEALTH BD. BUDGET COMM., REPORT BY THE ALASKA MENTAL
HEALTH BOARD BUDGET COMMITTEE ON THE 2003 BUDGET SUMMIT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2003), available at http://akmhcweb.org/Docs/AMHB/
2003BudgetSummitReport.pdf.
282. Id. at 7.
283. Id. at 8.
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Clearly, though, while the trial courts participate in the process, it is the
failure of psychiatric respondents’ counsel to raise the issues presented
here (and others), to introduce the evidence discussed herein, and then,
having done so, to prosecute appropriate appeals and other remedies,
which is where the legal system is most broken. Judges normally only
consider the issues and evidence presented to them by the parties’
attorneys. Our judicial system is premised upon the respective parties’
attorneys being zealous advocates for the ends desired by their clients.
Where, as in these cases, this fundamental aspect of our judicial system is
not employed for one side, the judicial process does not work properly.
This should be remedied. The stakes are enormous for the lives of
psychiatric respondents, for the public good, and for the integrity of the
judiciary itself.

